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COMMENTS

A CONFLICT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
DEFAMATION AND THE ROLE OF CONTENT
IN THE WAKE OF DUN & BRADSTREET V.
GREENMOSS BUILDERS
Of course statesmanship is a craft few possess in the highest degree, and those who have it do not always exercise it
for the public good. Of course very few Athenians in their
assembly could claim to be statesmen. But the case for
giving them a voice and a vote does not rest on the assumption that they are experts in statecraft; instead it involves several assumptions. The first, as voiced by
Protagoras and later by Aristotle, is that you cannot have a
community or city unless everyone-generally speaking-has
that modicum of civic virtue, that respect for public opinion and that sense of justice, which makes living together
possible. The second is that it makes for social stability if
the citizens feel that they have some voice in determining
the issues that affect their own lives and welfare.
I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the application of constitutional principles
to defamation law is brief,' but has already spawned a substantial body of judicial interpretation and academic comment.2 The constitutional law regarding defamation has

1. The first case to apply constitutional limitations to the common law of
defamation, established by the states, was N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

(1964).
2. This article surveys the main Supreme Court cases. Academic articles are
too numerous to be listed here, but an interesting cross-section can be found in
the publications of several symposia on the subject, including: Symposium: New

Perspectives in the Law of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 677 (1986); Melville B.
Nimmer Symposium, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1331 (1987); Symposium: Libel, 38 MERCER L.
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evolved rapidly, perhaps because first amendment restraints on
defamation actions relate directly to the rights and responsibilities of the information media, which have expanded considerably in both quantity and influence during the same period.
This swift development has not, however, created a clear, functional set of legal principles.' Both plaintiffs and defendants
are dissatisfied with the complexity, expense and unpredictability of defamation suits.4
The Supreme Court, through a series of cases, has forged
a doctrine which determines the level of constitutional protection for defamatory statements based primarily on the status of
the plaintiff, that is, the person or entity defamed.5 In so doing, the Court has emphasized and relied on three basic premises: first, that it is more difficult to administer a standard
based on statement content than one based on plaintiff status;' second, that public officials and public figures can counter reputational injuries more effectively because they have
greater access to the media, and they have assumed the risk of
such injuries by voluntarily taking positions of public influ-

REV. 767 (1987).
3. As stated in 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 1 (1970):
The law relating to defamation is a limitation upon the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press, and the vagarious
and complex structure of such law, as it exists today, is to a large
extent a direct result of the friction between it, as a restriction on
untrammeled freedom of expression, and the highly cherished rights
of freedom of speech and of the press.
Id.
4. See Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455 [hereinafter Franklin, Winners and Losers];
Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 789 (1986) [hereinafter Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect];
Wissler, Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, Why Curent Libel Law Doesn't Work and
What Judges Can Do About It, 27 JUDGE'S J. 28 (Spring 1988) [hereinafter Wissler,
Why Cument Libel Law Doesn't Work].
5. See Franklin, Contitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1657 (1987) [hereinafter Franklin, ConstitutionalLibel Law].
Although most of the central rationales for the result [in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan] were presented in terms of the value of the
speech, the Court framed its rule in terms of the status of plaintiffs . . . . After a tentative shift of the focus from plaintiff to content by applying the actual malice standard to any story implicating
"general or public interest," the Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., returned the focus to plaintiffs.
Id. at 1660, 1662 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971)).
6. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
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ence;7 and third, that a content-based standard would not be
sufficiently protective of the media.' The Court has concluded
that plaintiffs who achieve the status of public figures must
show that a defamatory statement regarding their public office
or activities was made with "actual malice"9 before recovering
damages in a defamation action.
These premises are not, however, sufficient to fully explain the manner in which constitutional limitations on defamation recovery are applied. Indeed, a recent decision by the
Supreme Court has given cause to doubt whether they are
even at the heart of the analysis."° Though not central to the
language of the Court's stated test for applying constitutional
limits to the law of defamation, the determination of whether
a defamatory statement involves issues of significant concern
to a large public audience has been a primary consideration in
the formation and application of those limits." The purpose
of this comment is to describe the role of statement content in
the constitutional law of defamation.
To appreciate the importance of statement content in
applying first amendment restraints on the common law of
defamation, it is necessary first to examine the decisional background of constitutional defamation law: how the current doctrine has evolved and the problems created in the application
of that doctrine. After setting out that background, this comment will analyze the role that content has played in the evolution of constitutional defamation law in the Supreme Court,
and in the application of constitutional limitations by the lower

7. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. See also Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
8. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
9. Actual malice has been defined by the Supreme Court as: "knowledge
that [the statement] was false or . . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Private plaintiffs
need only meet the traditional requirements of proving that a published or broadcast statement was defamatory, concerned the plaintiff, and could be presumed to
have damaged his or her reputation. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 262-63.
10. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.& 749 (1985).
11. As Professor Franklin summarizes:
In brief, the mess has resulted from the Court's preoccupation with
the status of the libel plaintiff to the virtual exclusion of the content
of the defamatory speech. Categorization based on the status of the
plaintiff alone is inconsistent with what led the Court to protect false
speech in the first place.
Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law, supra note 5, at 1657.
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federal courts. This comment suggests that the question of
whether a particular statement implicates a matter of public
concern is central to the reasoning, if not the language, of
every major Supreme Court decision.'" In addition, this comment notes that the issue of content constitutes the central
inquiry in one of the most widely used tests of constitutional
status in the lower federal courts."s This comment will then
consider the role that statement content has played in the application of first amendment limitations to related,
non-defamation causes of action. 4 Finally, the comment will
argue that it is a conflict in the public interest-not a conflict
between individuals, or the public and an individual-which is
at the heart of the question of when and how to apply free
speech protections to defamation. 5 An effective analysis of
these competing interests must explicitly determine whether
issues of broad public concern are involved in a particular case
or it fails to address the central issue presented by this area of
the law. The comment concludes that the determination of
whether a defamatory statement implicates issues of public
concern should be explicitly recognized as the basis for apply-

12. For example: "Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964) (emphasis added).
There is, first, a strong interest in debate on public issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a
position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues.
The thrust of New York Times is that when interests in public discussion are pailicularly strng as they were in that case, the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of defamation.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,.85-86 (1966) (emphasis added). "The dissemination of the individual's opinions on mattes of public interest is for us, in the historic words of the Declaration of Independence, an 'unalienable right' that 'governments are instituted among men to secure.'" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 149 (1967) (emphasis added). See also infra notes 54-109 and accompanying text.
13. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Although still nominally applying the status-based test devised by the Supreme
Court, as the first and most significant step in the test for determining whether
the actual malice standard will be imposed, this case requires the courts to determine whether or not a "public controversy" is involved. See also infra notes 110-23
and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 124-232 and accompanying text.
15. See infin notes 233-63 and accompanying text.
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ing first amendment limitations to defamation actions, in order to ensure that the purposes and policies justifying the imposition of such limitations are adequately considered, before
they are applied.16
BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEFAMATION LAW AND PROBLEMS IN ITS APPLICATION

II.
A.

The Evolution of the Actual Malice Standard

In 1964, with its decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 7 the Supreme Court began applying the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution to the common
law of defamation to limit the states' power to impose liability
for false speech.'" These limits proceed from the Supreme
Court's holding in New York Times:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
.actual malice"- that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' 9
Since that benchmark decision, which applied what has become known as the "actual malice" standard to government
officials only, the constitutional doctrine limiting defamation
actions has evolved rapidly. Soon after its decision in New York
Times, the Court extended limitations on defamation to
non-governmental "public figures" as well as public officials,
reasoning that "[o]ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial
interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the
press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement
in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of
20
'public officials."'
16. See infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18.

As one federal district court has summarized it:
Modern defamation law is fundamentally State Law with restric-

tions and modifications as imposed nationwide by paramount law, by
virtue of the guaranty of free press and free speech in the First
Amendment applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The history of these changes begins with N.Y. Times v. Sullivan.
Prager v. American Broadcasting Co., 569 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (D.N.J. 1983).
19.
20.

N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
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Perhaps the broadest interpretation of the Constitution as
a limit on defamation actions, and the first explicitly embracing the role of content in determining the applicability of
those limits, was the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia."' In Rosenbloom, the Court held that the "actual
malice" standard established by New York Times should be applied to "all discussion and communication involving matters
of public or general concern, without regard to whether the
persons involved are famous or anonymous."2 2 The Court
abandoned the consideration of plaintiff status, instead hinging
application of the "actual malice" standard solely on statement
content.
However, the Court subsequently revised its definition of
how the "actual malice" standard would be applied.2" In Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the New
York Times standard, and held that it applied to both public
officials and public figures.25 But the Court also expressly overturned Rosenbloom, returning to a more strictly status-based
analysis. The Court stated:
[W]e conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for
defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a pri-

concurring in result). The Court was not precise in defining who would be considered a public figure; however, the court made it clear that the rule of New York
Times would no longer be limited to government representatives. The majority
opinion also established a slightly different standard of proof than that required

of public officials in New York Times, holding[A] "public figure" who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes a substantial
danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure fiom the standards of investigation

and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.
Id.

at 155 (emphasis added). The standard to be applied to public figures was

later unified with that applied to public officials. See infra note 25.
21. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
22. Id. at 44 (footnote omitted).
23. "Since [Rosenbloom] the Supreme Court has drawn back from the public
issue formulation. This was in Gertz v. Welch ....
" Prager v. American Broadcasting Co., 569 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (D.N.J. 1983).
24. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
25.

The Court related the facts and holding of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,

388 U.S. 130 (1967), and noted that "[iun his concurring opinion, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren stated the principle for which these cases stand-the New York
Times test reaches both public figures and public officials." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 336
n.7.
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vate individual. The extension of the New York Times test
proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this
legitimate state interest to a degree that we find un-

acceptable.26
Furthermore, the Court did not simply reinstate the "actual malice" doctrine as it existed prior to Rosenbloom, but also
modified the damages available to plaintiffs. A private-figure
plaintiff who successfully pursued an action for defamation
could recover "only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury."27 Thus, like their public counterparts, private figures could recover presumed28 or punitive damages only upon a showing of "actual malice."
Recently, the Supreme Court further modified the scope
of the "actual malice" doctrine. In Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders,29 the Court again introduced the concept
of adjusting defamation recovery based on whether the matters
involved were of public concern. In the context of an action by
a private-figure construction contractor against a corporate
defendant for disseminating a false credit report, the Court
stated that "[i]n light of the reduced constitutional value of
speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that
the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and
30
punitive damages-even absent a showing of 'actual malice."'
The Court thus modified its holding in Gertz, establishing that
presumed and punitive damages could be awarded in an action
by a private figure plaintiff without a showing of "actual mal-

26. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.
27. Id. at 350. The Court did not define "actual injury," except to say that it
was not limited to out-of-pocket losses, and might include "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish
and suffering . . . supported by competent evidence." Id. at 350. However, it is
almost certainly to be construed as covering the same types of injuries as are
provided for by the "special damages" provisions of state statutory and common
law. See, e.g., the California Civil Code: "Special damages are all damages which
plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(b) (West 1982).
28. "[W]e hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or
punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
29. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
30. Id. at 761.
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ice," so long as the statements at issue were not of public con31
cern.

The constitutional law of defamation now stands as follows: With regard to public officials and non-governmental
public figures, the Court requires the plaintiff to prove that a
defamatory statement was published with "actual malice" in
order to obtain damages of any kind. 2 The only
well-established exceptions to this requirement, arise, first,
when the defamatory statement is made with regard to purely
private conduct, rather than the official conduct, of a public
official;33 and, second, where a public figure becomes such by
virtue of the attention focused on him or her due to the
defendant's defamation. 4
If the plaintiff is a private figure, constitutional limits now
require a showing of "actual malice" only where the plaintiff
seeks to recover presumed or punitive damages and the defamatory speech is of public concern. 5 Subsequent cases have
not significantly modified the roles of plaintiff status and statement content.3 6 Neither have they altered the level of damages allowed the various classes of plaintiffs.
B. Problems in Application: The Public-PrivateDistinction in the
Lower Courts
Although it has once again introduced the analysis of
statement content into the constitutional jurisprudence of
defamation, the Court's analysis is still primarily focused on
the status of the plaintiff. 7 However, the Court has never
clearly defined the distinction between public and private figures upon which that analysis is based.

31. Id. at 763.
32. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1973).
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
34. See Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
35. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1984); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1973).
36. See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); see also
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Note, however, that Philadelphia
Newspapeis does impose a requirement that a private figure plaintiff demonstrate
the falsity of the defamatory statement, "at least where a newspaper publishes
speech of public concern." Philadelphia Newspapei3, 475 U.S. at 768-69 (emphasis
added).

37.

See Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law, supra note 5.
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The task of providing detailed criteria for making the
determination of plaintiff status has been left to the lower
courts. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the determination of status does not free the courts from questions of
statement content. 38 The fact that the courts have considered
statement content, tacitly or explicitly, is not alone a sufficient
basis upon which to question the primarily status-based test
established by the Supreme Court. If the result is consistently
proper, the analysis is best left alone. However, the assertion
that the courts must explicitly address the issue of content is
also supported by the results obtaining in lower court cases
utilizing the public-private distinction. A few examples will
serve to illustrate this point.
In Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co.,3 1 the court found an

erstwhile beauty queen and her retired football-player husband
to be public figures for the purposes of an article reporting an
affair between the wife and Elvis Presley and the divorce of the
husband and wife. Although the court found the article to be
defamatory per se, it found that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the requisite "actual malice," and reversed the lower
court, entering judgment for the defendant.4" Noting that
Gertz established that "the press is not adequately protected by
a rule that allows a court to determine whether a published article is relevant to an issue of general or public interest," 41 the
court held:
In our view, the plaintiffs in this case were, at least at
some time and for purposes of some articles, public figures who, as such, must prove defendant's "malice," not
because they are to be punished for having sought press
attention but, rather, because the first amendment requires that the press be afforded the protection of the
"malice" standard vis-a-vis those who have sought its coverage, either through direct invitation or by participating in
activities whose success depends in large part on publicity.

38. See infr'a notes 110-23 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the fact that
an individual may be held to be an "involuntary" public figure, as in Dameron v.
Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1985), indicates that the
nature of the controversy may be a more central concern than the status of the
plaintiff in some cases. This will also be discussed further below.
39. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cen. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1980).
40. Id. at 1260
41. Id. at 1252-53.
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In performing its role the press covers not only political
events and public controversies, but also sports and entertainment."
Here the court followed the status test to its logical extreme,
essentially holding that any matter on which the press is
privileged to report is sufficient to support a finding that any
person involved in that matter is a public figure. Moreover, the
court explicitly rejected the possibility that a finding of public
figure status might be connected in any way with the content
of the defamatory statement.
In Carson v. Allied News Co.,43 the court of appeals accepted, almost without discussion, the finding of the district court
that entertainer Johnny Carson and his second wife, Joanna
Holland, were public figures for the purposes of articles alleging that Carson had moved his show to Hollywood, prior to
divorcing from his first wife, in order to be near Holland.
Here again, the notoriety of the plaintiffs was sufficient to
require the imposition of the "actual malice" standard despite
the absence of any "interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.""
In Woy v. Turner,4 5 the court found the sports agent of a
professional baseball player involved in a contract dispute to
be a public figure for the purpose of defamatory comments
made about him by the owner of the baseball franchise in a
televised interview. The court found that the agent was a public figure because he had "voluntarily thrust himself into the
forefront of a public controversy-the contractual dispute. "46
The court set out a three-part test for determining when a
plaintiff would be considered a public figure, which emphasized the factors cited by the Gertz court and contained no
reference to the substance of the defamatory statement.
Finally, in Gomez v. Murdoch,47 the court found a jockey
to be a public figure for the purposes of an article accusing
him of having held back his horse and "'robbed' those persons

42. Id. at 1255.
43. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
44. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
45. 573 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
46. Id. at 38.
47. 193 N.J. Super. 595, 475 A.2d 622 (1984).
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who had bet on the. horse 'as if he had plucked money out of
their wallets.'"4" The court stated:
[T]he trial judge said that "there is no way in the world
that a man could decide to become a jockey, put the silks
on and ride before hundreds of thousands of people...
and not call himself a public figure." The judge also stated
that "many people on television see him run," and further
mentioned "the public interest in horseracing."

. .

. We

agree with the
trial judge's view that plaintiff here was a
49
public figure.
The court thus found the jockey to be a public figure on the
basis of his participation in the sport of horseracing, without
considering whether the "public interest in horseracing" was
sufficiently important to justify the imposition of the burden of
proving "actual malice" on the plaintiff. The court further
noted that "[w]e are not here dealing with comments about
the plaintiff's activities outside of his professional life, which
comments would not be privileged except in the case of a
person of pervasive fame or notoriety."0 So, even while limiting the case at hand, the court states its understanding that
essentially any comment regarding a person of "pervasive fame
or notoriety" will be subject to the "actual malice" test.
It can, perhaps, be argued that these decisions were simply incorrect in their interpretation of current constitutional
doctrine. If that is so, it merely strengthens the argument that
doctrinal reform is needed. Because the determination of status lends itself to decisions based on the notoriety of the plaintiff rather than on the interests intended to be served by
imposing constitutional limitations, such errors are probably
inevitable.
In addition, although each of these cases was decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dun &?Bradstreet, that
decision would not have assisted these plaintiffs. The exception
framed in Dun & Bradstreet, at least as it was established in that
case, permits the award of presumed or punitive damages
absent a showing of "actual malice" only when the plaintiff is

48. Id. at 599, 475 A.2d at 624.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 600, 475 A.2d at 625.
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not a public figure." As the cases above indicate, a statusbased test which makes no reference to statement content will
preclude most plaintiffs from ever reaching that exception.
C.

Problem and Proposal

The difficulties engendered by a primarily status-based
analysis are inherent to that analysis. By looking to the status
of the plaintiff, rather than the nature of the issue involved,
constitutional limitations are imposed or denied depending on
the notoriety of the plaintiff. Although the Supreme Court has
attempted to limit the doctrine by requiring the statement to
relate to the plaintiffs participation in "public issues and
events,"5 2 the cases outlined immediately above indicate that
the "actual malice" standard has been imposed despite the
questionable public importance of the information involved.
As long as the primary denominator remains the status of the
plaintiff, the result is not necessarily determined by the main
interest justifying the imposition of constitutional limitations:
the public interest served by the dissemination of such information.
The Supreme Court's continuing reliance on a primarily
status-based analysis is not a necessary evil. This comment suggests that, despite the current formulation of constitutional
defamation law, the consideration of statement content has
always played an important role in the Supreme Court's decisions. This role has been strengthened by the decisions of
some lower courts, especially by the status-determination test
53 Furthermore,
set out in Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications.
the Supreme Court has explicitly or implicitly incorporated the
consideration of statement content into the constitutional jurisprudence of several related, non-defamation causes of action.
This comment also attempts to identify the nature of the
competing interests at stake in the law of defamation-reputation and freedom of speech-in order to determine
whether current constitutional doctrine adequately addresses
these interests, and concludes that it does not. The comment

51.

See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.

52. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
53. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), ceil. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). See infra
notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
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then proposes a content-based test for the application of constitutional limitations on defamation actions.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Role of Content in the Supreme Court Decisions
1. Content Priorto the Gertz Decision

The reasoning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 4 upon
which constitutional defamation law is largely founded, assumes a conflict between "the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"55 on the
one hand, and the interest of public officials in protecting
their official reputation on the other.56 The opinion is largely
concerned with the importance of protecting the public's ability to comment on matters of official conduct," an emphasis
restated in the concurring opinions.5" The Court mentions
the special status of public officials only to analogize the protection for the public created by the "actual malice" standard
with the absolute privilege granted to all statements of public
officials made "within the outer perimeter""9 of their duties.
The holding explicitly requires a determination of the content
of a defamatory statement, by limiting its application to "defamatory falsehood relating to [the public official's] official
conduct."6 The court must determine whether the statement
impugns an official's conduct in office, because if it does not,
the statement fails to involve the public interest in the quality
of governance. Because the holding was limited to public officials, however, New York Times set the stage for a series of in-

54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. Id. at 270.
56. Id. at 272-73.
57. The New York Times Court stated:
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, "was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."
Id. at 269 (emphasis added); see also id. at 269-70.
58. See id. at 293-305 (Black, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 282 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959)).
60. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
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terpretations which resulted in the emergence of a doctrine
based primarily on the status of the plaintiff.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,6 which extended the ruling of New York Times to public figures who are not employed
as public officials, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court
still cited the protection of the public interest in self-government as the primary goal of the "actual malice" doctrine.6" At
the same time, however, the Court utilized the concept of
plaintiff status as a justification for the extension of the doctrine, noting that "as a class these 'public figures' have as ready
access as 'public officials' to mass media of communication,
both to influence policy and counter criticism of their views
and activities."6" Having extended the standards of New York
Times beyond the realm of the patently official, and having
done so by comparing the status and influence of public figures to their official counterparts, the Court relied on the delimiting principle of plaintiff status as providing the clearest
basis for determining when that standard should be applied.
The basis for the Court's preference for the subtleties of status
over the complexities of determining whether the content of a
defamation invoked the first amendment would be spelled out
in the Gertz decision.64
Before being recapitulated by Gertz, however, the "actual
malice" doctrine briefly abandoned consideration of plaintiff
status altogether. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,6 5 the analysis of
plaintiff status was replaced by a determination of whether the
content of the defamation was "of public or general inter-

61. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
62. This was evident in both the majority opinion and the influential concurrence of Chief Justice Warren. In the majority opinion the Court discussed the
conflict between "the important public interest in being informed about the events
and personalities involved . . . [and] society's 'pervasive and strong interest in
preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.'" Id. at 146. The majority
noted that "[w]e fully recognize the force of these competing considerations and
the fact that an accommodation between them is necessary not only in these
cases, but in all libel actions arising from a publication concerning public issues." Id.
at 147 (emphasis added). In his concurrence, Chief Justice Warren added that
"many who do not hold public office at the moment are nonetheless intimately
involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their
fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id. at 164.
63. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
64. See infra notes 69-97 and accompanying text.
65. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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est."" The plurality opinion stated that application of the "actual malice" standard since New York Times had "disclosed the
artificiality, in terms of the public interest, of a simple distinction between 'public' and 'private' individuals,"6 7 and held
that "constitutional protection [extends] to all discussion and
communication involving matters of public or general concern,
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous."6 8 The role of content in determining the application of constitutional limitations on defamation recovery was
thus made explicit in Rosenbloom, but a precise definition of
what constituted a matter of public concern was not provided,
and a divided Court left the issue open for reconsideration.
2.

A Critique of the Gertz Decision

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,69 the Supreme Court returned to an application of constitutional limitations based primarily on plaintiff status, explicitly addressing and rejecting
the pure content test created in Rosenbloom.7 ° The Court attempted to define the requirements for the application of the
"actual malice" doctrine in a more circumspect fashion, seeking to prevent reputational injury to private individuals from
going unredressed. 7' Its reasons for rejecting the "public or
general interest" test of Rosenbloom were threefold.
a.

The Analysis of Content versus the Analysis of Status

First, the Gertz Court cited the "difficulty of forcing state
and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which
do not ....We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to

66. Id. at 43.
67. Id. at 41.
68. Id. at 44.
69. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
70. Id. at 345-46.
71. In rejecting the test formulated by the Rosenbloom court the Court in
Genz held:
[T]he States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual. The extension of the New York Times
test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate
state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable.
Id. at 345-46.
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judges."72 Although the Court found the vagaries of plaintiff
status less confounding than determining when a statement
involved an issue of public importance, it did not provide a
definitive test of that status.7 S Moreover, deciding exactly
what makes a plaintiff a public figure is not a simple task, nor
does it free the court from considerations of content. As an
examination of the criteria established by the federal courts in
Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications4 and the cases following it
discloses, the analysis of whether a statement involved a "public controversy" 75 would turn out to be central to that definition. These criteria will be discussed in greater detail below,
but they essentially require the court to consider both the
nature of the controversy in which the plaintiff is involved, and
the content of the statements about the plaintiff.7 6 The
status-based test, then, did not relieve the courts of the task
that the Gertz majority found so onerous: that of analyzing and
categorizing the content of the defamatory statement.
b.

Distinctions Between Public and Private Plaintiffs

The Gertz Court drew a sharp distinction between private
individuals on one hand, and public officials and public figures
on the other.7 7 In doing so, the Court relied on two basic
premises. The first premise is that "[p]ublic officials and public
figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels
of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."70 The second premise asserts that "the
communications media are entitled to act on the assumption
that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory false-

72. Id. at 346.
73. The Gez Court limited the "actual malice" standard to "[t]hose who, by
reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which
they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures and those
who hold governmental office." Id. at 342.
74. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), ceil. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
75. Id. at 1296.
76. Id. at 1296-98. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the criteria employed by some of the federal courts in analyz-

ing when a plaintiff will be classified a public figure.
77. Gem, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
78. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
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hood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with
respect to the private individual."7 9
Both of these distinctions were anticipated by the
Rosenbloom opinion. Addressing the contention that public
figures are better able to respond to defamations by having
greater access to the media, the Rosenbloom Court stated:
While the argument that public figures need less protection because they can command media attention to counter criticism may be true for some very prominent people,
even then it is the rare case where the denial overtakes the
original charge .... If the states fear that private citizens
will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring
their ability to respond, rather than s0in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern.
Because the inquiry demanded by the New York Times "actual
malice" standard goes to both the conduct and state of mind
of the defendant,8 ' the difficulty of proving a sufficient degree of malice in publication is very great.8 2 That standard is
applied only to public figures, with the consequence that many
public figures, unable to meet the enhanced proof requirement, must see statements that even the publisher admits are
false go unanswered. Furthermore, even where the plaintiff is
able to obtain a retraction, as the Rosenbloom opinion noted,
"[d]enials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and
rarely receive the prominence of the original story."8 3 These

79. Id. at 345.
80. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971) (footnote omitted).
The Gez Court acknowledged that reply may be an insufficient remedy to one
defamed, noting that "an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo [the]
harm of defamatory falsehood . . . . But the fact that the self-help remedy of

rebuttal, standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our inquiry." Gemiz, 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
81. "It is the conduct element, therefore, on which we must principally focus
if we are to resolve the antithesis between civil libel actions and the freedom of
speech and press." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967). As
previously noted, in order to show "actual malice" the plaintiff must show, in
addition to the common law elements of the tort, that the defendant made the
defamatory statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
280 (1964). Furthermore, the plaintiff must show this with "convincing clarity." Id.
at 285-86.
82. See infra note 146.
83. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46.
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facts, combined with the cynicism with which we greet the
seemingly inevitable denials of the accused, indicate that
self-help rebuttal through the media is, at least at present, an
inadequate remedy. Especially in light of recent proposals for
an alternative remedy in defamation cases,84 it is apparent
that the presumption that a public-figure plaintiffs independent access to the media provides an adequate alternative to a
judicial remedy is unwarranted. Leaving the rectification of a
defamation up to the plaintiff
and the media has resulted in an
85
inconstant justice at best.

84. Several proposals providing for summary judgment proceedings or
extra-judicial arbitration in defamation cases argue the need for an alternative to
the present remedies of self-help or full-scale litigation. See, e.g., Franklin, A Declalatoiy Judgement Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 809 (1986), and
Barrett, Declaratoty Judgments for Libek A Better Altenative, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 847
(1986); H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Rep. Charles
Schumer); Wissler, Why Cument Libel Law Doesn't Work supra note 4, at 31.
Moreover, the need for an alternative to the traditional libel action would seem, if
anything, greater on the part of public figures than on the part of private individuals, who need not meet the "actual malice" standard. As Dean Bezanson has
recently noted:
Recovery for injury to the reputation of public figures-a category that
includes, although is not limited to, the wealthy and powerful whose
protection was greatest at common law-is much more difficult than
recovery for injury to the reputation of a private individual. While the
common law . . . was imperfect and somewhat class- biased in its
greater protection of the wealthy and powerful, it is nonetheless likely
that, as a rule, the greatest reputational damage to a career or to an
economic livelihood will occur in such persons. If this proposition is
accepted, the conclusion seems inescapable that the constitutional
privileges have limited the instances of the tort's operation to the
very cases in which the least reputational harm has occurred.
Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 542- 43 (1988).
85. The findings of the Iowa Libel Research Project support the assertion
that public figures are as much or more in need of an alternative to the present
system of libel litigation, and that they are unable to obtain satisfaction from the
media. As Dean Bezanson reports:
Plaintiffs-particularly public plaintiffs-often contact the media before
they contact a lawyer. The media response is usually offensive to the
plaintiffs, who report being angered by the media's indifference, arrogance, or insensitivity, and the plaintiffs' reactions appear to be a
significant factor in their decision to sue. Plaintiffs express their harm
in largely nonfinancial terms, and appear to engage a lawyer (usually
on some form of contingency) already having decided to sue.
Plaintiffs, particularly in public cases, hire lawyers specifically to bring
suit . ...

In significant respects, media defendants confirm this picture of
plaintiffs' actions and motivations. Defendants indicated that between
one third and one-half of libel-type complaints have validity, that a
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Addressing the question of whether, by entering the public arena, one has voluntarily assumed the risk of defamation
regarding one's involvement in public actions and events, the
Rosenbloom Court held:
We have recognized that "[e]xposure of the self to others
in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community" ....Voluntarily or not, we are all "public"
men to some degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives
of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or general concern ....Thus, the idea that

certain "public" figures have voluntarily exposed their
entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals
have kept theirs carefully
shrouded from public view is, at
86
best, a legal fiction.
There is a policy decision inherent in every determination of
where to place the burden of risk. It is reasonable to assert
that a person who assumes a public office or enters into a
public debate for the purpose of affecting its outcome assumes
the risk that his or her qualifications or performance will in
turn elicit public comment. Where an individual's actions impinge on the outcome of events which will affect a large sector
of the public, the principle of self-determination central to
democracy requires that the public be allowed to respond to
and comment on those actions. But what is the principle that
protects a libel regarding a person who, though sufficiently
well known to be considered a "public figure," may never have
participated in such events? The mere statistical probability
that one who attracts public curiosity will eventually be libeled
is not sufficient justification to assert that they have voluntarily
assumed the risk of such libels. The proposition that by driving
on a public highway we have assumed the risk of injury due to
the negligence or recklessness of another is untenable, and yet
the statistical probability of a driver being involved in such an
accident is almost certainly as high as the chance of a public
figure being defamed.

majority of plaintiffs seek vindication and punishment rather than
compensation for real economic loss, and that media organizations respond poorly to complaints.
Bezanson, The Libel Suit In Retrospect, supra note 4, at 791-92.
86. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 4748 (quoting Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
388 (1967)).
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False speech is insulated only to protect the true, and true
speech is protected primarily to promote social and political
self-determination. Therefore, any protection extended to defamatory statements must go toward the protection of statements whose value to public self-determination, were they true,
would be clear. No such value accrues to a statement simply by
virtue of its being made about a public figure. Nonetheless, the
actual malice doctrine has been applied where plaintiffs in
defamation actions were found to be public figures based on
their notoriety, even though the statements involved had nothing to do with their participation in events of political or social
importance. 7 Moreover, it is not at all clear that the
plaintiff's participation in the events giving rise to his or her
public figure status need be voluntary.
In setting out the guidelines for establishing public-figure
status, the Gertz court noted that "[h]ypothetically, it may be
possible for someone to become a public figure through no
purposeful action of his own."8 8 This possibility was not long
to remain hypothetical. In Dameron v. Washington Magazine,"
an air traffic controller, on duty at the time an airplane
crashed while approaching Dulles Airport, was found to be an
involuntary public figure for the purposes of an article about
the crash, despite his "relatively passive involvement in this
controversy."9 Therefore, the requirement of voluntary participation-one of the principle justifications for the Court's
distinction between public and private figures-is not
indispensible to a finding of public figure status.
Finally, placing the burden of risk of defamation on those
who attain a degree of public influence necessarily discourages
both private citizens and public figures from participating in
the resolution of public issues. Private citizens must avoid such
participation lest they be classed as public figures, and thus
subjected to the scrutiny and comment of the media with only
the most minimal recourse if that comment is libelous. As the
Rosenbloom opinion points out, a distinction in the level of

87. See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1980); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Woy v. Turner,

573 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1983), discussed supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
88. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
89. 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cefl. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
90. Id. at 741.
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protection given to a defamatory statement that is based on
the status of the defamed "could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens
while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of
aspects of the lives of 'public figures' that are not in the area
of public or general concern.""' The Court's decision in Dun
& Bradstreet makes it clear that statements which do not touch
on matters of public concern are to be considered of "reduced
constitutional value.""2 Although some degree of public scrutiny and comment is inevitable, the only justification for its
negative effect on individual participation is the necessity for
public participation. If matters of public concern are not at the
core of what constitutional defamation law seeks to protectand under a primarily status-based test they are not-then that
doctrine fails to protect the only interest that adequately justifies it.
c. Protecting the Media from Strict Liability
Finally, the Gertz Court reasoned that the content standard
was not sufficiently protective of the media, because "a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court
deems unrelated to an issue of public or general interest may
be held liable in damages even if it took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions."" This, however, is not a necessary effect of the Rosenbloom decision or of
utilizing a content-based test.
Long before Rosenbloom, publishers traditionally had been
held strictly liable for defamatory publications regardless of
whether they resulted from malice, negligence, or simply from
non-negligent error.9 4 The Gertz holding did nothing to alter

91. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 48.
92. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
93. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
94. The common law rule of strict liability in defamation has been described
as follows:
Following the rule laid down by the English decisions, the defendant
has been held liable, without regard to any question of negligence
... . The only limitation placed upon the liability is that the defamatory meaning and the reference to the plaintiff must be reasonably
conveyed to and understood by others . . ..
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this (in states which still adhered to the traditional strict liability rule) except to require a showing of at least negligence before a private plaintiff could recover presumed or punitive
damages. 5 This offered little additional protection to publish6
ers, because plaintiffs rarely obtain such damages.
In addition, nothing inherent in a content-based analysis
prevents liability from being premised on a showing of at least
negligence, if the Court believes that is necessary to prevent
chilling of first amendment rights. Such a doctrine would simply require the plaintiff to demonstrate negligence where no
issue of public concern was involved, and "actual malice"
where such an issue existed. Nor is there anything inherent in
the status-based test to prevent the courts from imposing liability despite good-faith efforts to ensure accuracy, if the plaintiff
is found to be a private figure. This was precisely the state of
the law following the decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
before the Gertz Court imposed the requirement of showing at
least negligence.
Finally, there is little constitutional value in protecting
publishers from defamation awards resulting from significant
reputational injuries, where no issue of public importance is
involved. The constitutional value of promoting political and
social self-determination is not promoted by limiting such
awards. The Court acknowledged this in Dun & Bradstreet,
holding that the New York Times standard should not be applied to limit recovery by a private plaintiff to "actual injury"
when no issue of public concern is implicated.9 7

The effect of this strict liability is to place the printed, written
or spoken word in the same class with the use of explosives or the

keeping of dangerous animals. If a defamatory meaning, which is
false, is reasonably understood, the defendant publishes at his peril,
and there is no possible defense except the rather narrow one of

privilege.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 772-73 (4th Ed. 1971).
95. Getz, 418 U.S. at 347.
96. In a study of defamation cases by Professor Franklin, punitive damages:
[W]ere sought in at least 134 (25 percent) of the 534 cases . ...
The appellate decisions in these cases reveal that only 2 plaintiffs in
media cases kept their punitive awards. Among the plaintiffs in
nonmedia cases, 16 kept punitive awards. During this period, lower
courts considered such damages constitutionally permissible in media
cases when the Times standard was met.

Franklin, Winners and Loseis, supra note 4, at 477 (footnotes omitted).
97. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
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Summary

These premises, upon which the primarily status-based test
adopted by the Court is based, are not adequate to support either the predominance of considerations of status, or the relegating of content analysis to its current minor role. Self-help,
even for eminently public figures, has been shown to be an
inadequate recourse. The assertion that public figures have
voluntarily assumed the risk of defamation is also inadequate
to support the status test. The social policy ramifications of
placing the burden of risk of defamation on those who attempt
to influence events of public importance do not favor such a
disposition of risk, and have led the courts to impose a higher
burden of proof even where no issue of first amendment importance is involved. Indeed, it is not clear that voluntary participation in the public events at issue is even a requirement.
Nor does the utilization of a content-based test necessarily involve a greater risk of chilling free speech.
Moreover, even in articulating these distinctions the Court
did not free itself entirely from considerations of statement
content. With regard to public figures, the Court defined the
outer limit of a statement that might demand first amendment
protection by stating that "the public's interest extends to 'anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office."'' 8
With regard to public figures, the Court held that a plaintiff
might be so deemed where they had a prominent role in "the
affairs of society" or "particular public controversies."9 9 However, these limitations on the kind of content that might be
protected were not sufficient to guide the lower courts, and
the Court would be obliged to modify the doctrine yet
again.100

98. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 232, 344-45 (1974) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)).
99. Id. at 345.
100. The Court granted certiorari in Dun & Bradstreet based on its recognition
that there was "disagreement among the lower courts about when the protections
of Gettz apply." Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 753
(1984).
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The Reemergence of Content Since the Gertz Decision

In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,'°' the Court
reintroduced the consideration of statement content, in order
to limit the requirement imposed by Gertz that a private figure
plaintiff demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth of a statement before recovering presumed or punitive damages. The Court held that this
requirement would be imposed only when the statements at
issue "involve matters of public concern."" 2 Although the
Court's holding was narrow, its language was not. In arriving
at the conclusion that it would not apply the limitations to
recovery imposed on private figures by Gertz where no matter
of public concern is involved, the Court stated:
[S]peech on matters of purely private concern is of less
First Amendment concern. As a number of state courts,
including the court below, have recognized, the role of the
Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more limited when the concerns that activated New York Times and
Gertz are absent. In such a case "there is no threat to the
free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability
03
causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press."1
If speech on matters of purely private concern is less deserving
of first amendment protection, it is difficult to perceive why
such speech should be granted protection simply because it is
made with regard to a public figure. Nonetheless, just such an
outcome has resulted in some cases,0 4 and is probably unavoidable as long as the application of limitations on defamation actions is premised on a plaintiff's public-figure status,
and does not consider statement content. Furthermore, the
Court in Dun & Bradstreet provided no detailed criteria for
determining when a matter of public concern is presented,
referring only to its holding in Connick v. Myers that "'wheth-

101. 472 U.S. 749 (1984).
102. Id. at 763.
103. Id. at 759-60 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports v. Markley, 279 Or.
361, 366, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 (1977)).
104. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
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er... speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by the expression's content, form, and context...
as revealed by the whole record."" 5
Although its impact on the consititutional law of defamation was not as dramatic, another recent case has confirmed
the importance of content in the Supreme Court's analysis of
defamation claims. In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,11 6 the
Supreme Court imposed another content-based restriction on
defamation claims, holding that "at least where a newspaper
publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements
at issue are false."' 7 The impact of this ruling was to shift
the burden of proof on the issue of falsity. Under traditional
defamation law, a statement would not be found defamatory if
the defendant could prove that it was true. Truth, then, was a
complete defense to a defamation claim. Under the Supreme
Court's ruling, where an issue of public concern is involved,
the burden is shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the statement is false. In its opinion, the Court emphasized the role
that content had played in the application of first amendment
limitations to the common law of defamation, noting:
One can discern in [the previous Supreme Court decisions] two forces that may reshape the common-law
landscape to conform to the First Amendment. The first is
whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is
instead a private figure. The 0second
is whether the speech
8
at issue is of public concern.

The Court added another content-based restriction to the
constitutional doctrine, but again failed to articulate any clear
criteria for determining when
a statement would be considered
09
concern.
public
of
one

105. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 147-48 (1983)).
106. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
107. Id. at 768-69 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 775.
109. See Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Buildeis, Philadelphia Newspaper,
v. Hepps, and Speech on Matters of Public Concern: New Directions in Fint Amendment
Defamation Law, 20 IND. L. REV. 767, 792 ("[T]he Supreme Court has not promulgated any guidelines to aid lower courts and litigants in seeking to determine
whether speech is of public concern.")
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The conflict between the status and content tests has not
been resolved. The Court in Gertz embraced a primarily statusbased test as the more balanced and limited of the two. However, the principles on which that test depended were not
sufficient to properly balance the important competing interests at stake. The reappearance of the issue of content in Dun
& Bradstreet and PhiladelphiaNewspapers, and the lack of specific guidelines for determining the nature of such content, indicate the need for further reconsideration and clarification of
this important area of constitutional law.
B. The Waldbaum Case and the Role of Content in the Lower
Courts
The Supreme Court decisions establishing the status test
expressed distrust of the ability of judges to determine when
the content of a defamatory statement involved issues of public
importance. 1 ' They failed, however, to establish detailed criteria for determining precisely what a public figure might be.
That task was left to the lower courts. In Waldbaum v. Fairchild
Publications,"' the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia devised a widely adopted test for determining publicfigure status." 2 This test demonstrates the degree to which
the courts, while embracing the status test adopted by the
Supreme Court, have been forced to consider questions of
content.
The main steps established by the Waldbaum court are:
first, whether a plaintiff may be classified as a "general public
figure"; 3 and then, through a three-step process, whether
he or she is to be considered a "public figure for limited purposes.""' To answer the first question, the Waldbaum court
considered several factors, including previous coverage of the

110. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974); see also supia text
accompanying note 72 (quoting Gez).
111. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cei. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
112. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Trotter v.
Jack Anderson Enterprises, 818 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1987); O'Donnell v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 782 F.2d 1414, 1417 (7th Cir. 1986); Dameron v.
Washington Magazine 779 F.2d 736, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bruno & Stillman v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 591-92 (1st Cir. 1980).
113. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
ceil.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
114. Id.
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plaintiff in the press, whether people actually reevaluate their
conduct or ideas in light of the plaintiff's actions, and the
voluntariness of the plaintiff's prominence.1 5 In this analysis
the emphasis is on the status of the plaintiff, and the criteria
set by the court are designed to establish the scope and willingness of the plaintiff's influence, and his or her access to the
media. However, as the Waldbaum holding went on to note:
Few people, of course, attain the general notoriety that
would make them public figures for all purposes ....
[E]ven if a court finds that a plaintiff is not a general purpose public figure, it still must examine "the nature and
extent of an individual's participation in 6the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation."'

The court then proceeded to describe the three-step process
by which it proposes to identify those who, although not sufficiently notorious to qualify as public figures per se, will nonetheless be considered public figures in the context of a particular issue:
As the first step in its inquiry, the court must isolate the
public controversy. A public controversy is not simply a
matter of interest to the public; it must be a real dispute,
the outcome of which affects the general public or some
segment of it in an appreciable way. The Supreme Court
has made it clear that essentially private concerns or dis-

agreements do not become public controversies simply
because they attract attention. Rather, a public controversy
is a dispute that in fact has received public attention bewill be felt by pemsons who are not direct
cause its ramifications
7
participants.11

The court, then, must not only determine whether the plaintiff
was involved in a public controversy, but also if the controversy implicated matters of genuine public concern. It is impossible, obviously, to make such a determination without considering the content of the issue at hand. The Waldbaum opinion

115. Id. at 1295.
116. Id. at 1296 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352
(1974)).
117. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976)) (emphasis
added).
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provides a practical and useful standard for making that determination, defining a public controversy, as emphasized above,
as one the ramifications of which will be felt by persons who
8
are not direct participants."
In the second step of its test, the Waldbaum opinion examined the extent of the plaintiff's participation, requiring that
"[t]he plaintiff either must have been purposely trying to influence the outcome or ...

realistically have been expected, be-

cause of his position in the controversy, to have an impact on
its resolution.""' Although framed as an examination of the
voluntariness of the plaintiffs participation, as emphasized by
the Supreme Court in Gertz, this criterion amounts to little
more than a requirement that the plaintiff have been substantially involved, voluntarily or otherwise. In a more recent decision in the same circuit, a plaintiff was found to be an "involuntary public figure,"' 20 thus establishing that voluntary participation in a controversy is not an indispensible prerequisite
to application of the "actual malice" standard.
Finally, the Waldbaum criteria explicitly address the content of the defamatory statement, holding:
[T]he alleged defamation must have been germane to the
plaintiff's participation in the controversy. His talents,
education, experience, and motives could have been relevant to the public's decision whether to listen to him. Misstatements wholly unrelated to the controversy, however,
do not receive the New York Times protection. 2 '

118. The difficulty of defining when an issue of public concern is implicated
was

one

of

the

reasons

cited

by

the

Supreme

Court

for

rejecting

the

content-based test of Rosenbloom. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346.
This difficulty has also been emphasized by commentators. T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 541 (1970) ("Efforts to define the concept of
'public issue' in the field of libel law have been . . . fruitless."); Lewis, supra note
109, at 792 ("[lI]t may be that . . . the question is just too difficult to handle.").
However, the Waldbaum opinion provides an excellent objective criteria-the

ramifications of the issue for non-participants-by which to make this determination. This is not to suggest that the determination will be a simple matter, only
that it is a manageable one.
119. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
120. Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
ceil. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (emphasis omitted), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 89-90.
121. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298 (footnote omitted).
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Here the Waldbaur court emphasizes the point noted above:
status alone is not the determining factor even in the status
test, or any statement made regarding a plaintiff who had been
found to be a public figure would be protected by the "actual
malice" standard. 2 2 Taken together, the criteria adopted by
the Waldbaum court form a test in which the dominant concerns are the content of the defamatory statement and whether that content involves issues of public importance. Although
couched in the language of the "assumption of the risk" and
"enhanced ability to respond" arguments relied on by the Gertz
Court, 123 the question of content emerges as the central ele-

ment in those criteria. As the Waldbaum opinion indicates,
only by addressing the content of a defamatory statement can
the courts adequately assess and balance the conflicting public
interests involved in this area of the law.
C. Consideration of Statement Content in Applying First Amendment Limitations to Non-Defamation Actions
Since the United States Supreme Court's ruling in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 2 4 recovery for injury to reputation
under state tort law has been limited by the first amendment.
Through a series of cases,' 25 first amendment limitations on
state defamation actions have been crafted into a comprehensive constitutional doctrine. However, in the same period tort
law has also evolved. States have increasingly come to recognize a need to protect privacy and emotional tranquility as well
as reputation. Actions based on the invasion of these interests
are now commonly pleaded as additional counts in defamation
suits.

26

The Supreme Court has begun to extend constitu-

of privacy and intentional limitations to actions for invasion
127
tional infliction of emotional distress.

122. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that the Gerz test has led at least one court to precisely this conclusion; see
supra note 50 and accompanying text.

123. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294-98.
124. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
125. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985),
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403

U.S. 29
126.
Falwell,
127.

(1971); and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v.
20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 430 (1988).
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Hustler Magazine v.
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The role that statement content plays in the application of
constitutional limitations to defamation actions is primarily
subtextual; that is, it is not explicitly addressed, but is nonetheless an important consideration. In certain non-defamation
areas, however, the question of whether the publication at
issue involves matters of public concern is specifically incorporated into constitutional doctrine. 121 In other areas, the question of public concern, or "newsworthiness," seems to play an
important implicit role. 129 The Supreme Court's willingness
to consider the nature of the content of a publication in certain non-defamation actions, and the role that content plays
even when not explicitly considered, support the argument
that the examination of statement content would be useful in
defamation analysis as well.
1. The Role of Content in Actions for Invasion of Privacy
The American jurisprudence of privacy can be traced primarily, if not exclusively, to the seminal article of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy.' Although the
right of privacy has now become the basis for the assertion of
diverse rights, that article was primarily concerned with protecting individual privacy from intrusion by the press.' 3 ' The
article discussed the availability of damages for emotional distress, 3 2 and the inadequacy of traditional libel law to address

Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(public disclosure of private life); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S.
245 (1974) (false light); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false light). These
cases are discussed in some detail herein.
128. Those areas are the privacy actions based on public disclosure of one's
private life and publicity placing one in a false light; see infra notes 140-71 and
accompanying text. In the area of false light, however, the current vitality of that
role is not clear; see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 498 n.2

(1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
129. These are actions based on intrusion into one's seclusion, appropriation,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress; see infra notes 172-228 and accompanying text.

130. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Pivacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
References to this article are legion. A few citations from the legal areas discussed

in this article include: Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380 (1967); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A comment a (1965).
131. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 193-97.
132. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 197-98 n.l.
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33
Warren
the interests the authors sought to have protected.
and Brandeis argued for "a principle which may be invoked to
protect the privacy of the individual from invasion either by
the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor
of any other modern device for recording or reproducing
34

scenes or sounds.",

Even this earliest discussion of the right of privacy, however, recognized the requirement for limitations on such a
principle. The first limitation incorporated by Warren and
Brandeis was that "[t]he right of privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest.""3 5 The authors perceived the need to protect public
access to information that weighed upon issues of public importance: "Peculiarities of manner and person, which in the
ordinary individual should be free from comment, may acquire
a public importance, if found in a candidate for political of36

fice."1

This distinction, between matters that are of public concern and those that are not, has carried through at least in
part into the modern law of invasion of privacy. The tort of
invasion of privacy is generally divided into four catagories:
publicity given to another's private life (public disclosure);
publicity placing another in a false light (false light); intrusion
upon the seclusion of another (intrusion); and appropriation
3 7 The deterof another's name or likeness (appropriation).
mination of the public interest in the content of a publication
has been explicitly incorporated into the consitutional jurispru3
dence of the torts of public disclosure and false light. 3 That
determination may also play a role in the areas of intrusion
and appropriation.3 9 These actions, and the role that statement content plays in applying first amendment limitations to
each, will be examined in turn.

133.
134.

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 197-98.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 206.

135. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 214.
136. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 215.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-652E (1965).
138.
139.

See infra notes 140-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-96 and accompanying text.
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a. Public Disclosure
This action provides a remedy for the general publication
of facts which, although true, are private and not of legitimate
public concern. The Restatement describes the tort as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 4 °
The determination of statement content is an integral
element of the cause of action. If the matter is one of legitimate public concern, no liability will arise from its publication,
no matter how offensive the publicity.'
The analysis of the public interest in the content of a publication has been explicitly incorporated into the constitutional
analysis of the tort. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,142 the
Supreme Court considered the claim of the father of a woman
who had been raped and had subsequently died. The name of
the victim was obtained from indictments filed in the criminal
action against her attackers, and was broadcast by a Georgia
television station, in violation of a Georgia statute.141 Summary judgment was granted in favor of the victim's father, and
was affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court. 14 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed.

140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1965). This action actually
consists of four elements, which are spelled out in
§ 652D comments a-d.
First, the information must be publicized. This is not the same as "publication" in the context of defamation, where communication to a single person is
sufficient. For the purposes of a public disclosure action, the publicity must be to
the public generally, or to a very substantial number of people.
Second, the facts publicized must be private. No liability arises from the
publication of facts already made public, or for recording or publicizing actions
taken by a person in public. (Although surveillance that amounts to harassment
may give rise to an action for intrusion.)
Third, the publicity must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. A
community standard may be employed here.
Fourth, no liability attaches, even for highly offensive publicity, if the matter publicized is of legitimate public concern.

141.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

142. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
143. Id. at 471-74.
144. Id. at 474-75.

§ 652D comment d (1965).
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While recognizing the legitimacy of the need to protect
privacy, the Court in Cox Broadcasting also emphasized the
importance of countervailing first amendment interests. "Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of
information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which
is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here
that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional
freedoms of speech and press."' 45 The Court narrowly
framed the issue as "whether the State may impose sanctions
on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records."' 46 It found that the developing
law of privacy recognized a privilege for reports of judicial
proceedings. 4 7 Nonetheless, it went on to consider the issue
of whether such reports are a matter of public interest.
The conclusion is compelling when viewed in terms of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous press ....
By placing the information in the public domain on
official court records, the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby being
served .... The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our
type of government in which the citizenry 48is the final judge
of the proper conduct of public business.
The Supreme Court addressed the conflict between
the right to privacy and the need to ensure public access to
information of legitimate public concern in a number of subse"49
quent cases. In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, '
the Court held that a state court's pretrial order enjoining
publication of the name or photograph of an 11-year-old boy
involved in a juvenile proceeding was unconstitutional. In
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,' 5 ° the Court similarly held
unconstitutional a state statute forbidding publication of the
name of any juvenile offender without the approval of the
juvenile court. Most recently, the Supreme Court has returned

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 495.
430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
443 U.S. 97 (1979).

1030

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

to the issue of the publication of the name of a rape victim in
violation of state law. In Florida Star v. B.JF., 151the Supreme
Court struck down an award of damages based on a violation
of a Florida law prohibiting the publication of the name of any
victim of a sexual offense. Summarizing the principals of the
earlier cases, especially Daily Mail, the Court held that its initial inquiry when faced with such an issue would be "whether
the newspaper 'lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information about
a matter of public significance."

15
1

If the answer was affirma-

tive, the state would be required to show that the law was necessary "to further a state interest of the highest order."'
Taken together, these cases establish an essentially absolute privilege for the accurate publication of information obtained from public records. They can also be fairly characterized as embracing a determination of whether the information
published is of public concern. However, they fail to address a
number of situations where the right of privacy may conflict
with first amendment principles, most notably the situation in
which the information has not been obtained from a public
record. They also fail to establish whether the passage of time
plays any role in what will be considered a matter of public
interest. This leaves open the question of whether disclosure of
a matter that was once of public concern, and is still contained
in public records, can form the basis of liability if sufficient
154
time has passed.

The lower courts, however, have invoked the first amendment in denying liability for invasion of privacy in a number of
situations involving information not obtained from public records. In Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co.,' 55 plaintiff claimed
an invasion of privacy through public disclosure of private
facts, and defendants raised a defense of first amendment
privilege. 5 6 The court held that "the first amendment protects the publication of private facts that are 'newsworthy,' that

151.
152.

491 U.S. 524 (1989).
Id. at 536 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103

(1979)).
153. Id. at 537 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103

(1979)).
154. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93
Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971), imposing liability in such circumstances.
155. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
156. Id. at 307.
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is, of legitimate concern to the public."' 57 The court also recognized, however, that the privilege was not absolute.
Even where certain matters are clearly within the protected

sphere of legitimate public interest, some private facts
about an individual may lie outside that sphere ....
Therefore, to properly balance freedom of the press
against the right of privacy, every private fact disclosed in
an otherwise truthful, newsworthy publication must have
some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public
interest. 1
In Virgil v. Time, Inc.,'5 9 plaintiff sued for invasion
of privacy and the district court granted summary judgment
for defendant. The court of appeals vacated the summary judgment and remanded, holding:
The public's right to know is ... subject to reasonable
limitations so far as concerns the private facts of its individual members.
If the public has no right to know, can it yet be said
that the press has a constitutional right to inquire and to
inform? In our view it cannot. It is because the public has
a right to know that the press has a function to inquire
and to inform. The press, then, cannot be said to have any
right to give information greater than the extent to which
the public is entitled to have information.
We conclude that unless it be privileged as newsworthy ... the publicizing of private facts is not protected by
the First Amendment. 6°
These cases make it clear that the first amendment
places limitations on actions for invasion of privacy through
public disclosure of private facts, entirely apart from situations
where the report is based on information contained in public
records. They also make it clear that a primary consideration
in such cases will be whether the content of the publication is
of legitimate public concern.

157. Id. at 308 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967)).
158. Id.
159. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), ceil. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
160. Id. at 1128 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Syst. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973) and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969)).
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b. False Light
This action provides a remedy for the publication of false
statements which, while not necessarily defamatory, create an
incorrect and highly offensive impression of a person in others. It is worth noting that this action may be stated as an added basis for liability when a defamatory statement regarding
the plaintiff is based on information derived from or concerning the plaintiff's private life. Alternatively, it may be an independent cause of action where the statement places the plaintiff in an objectionable light, but is not actually defamatory. 161

The Supreme Court first considered the constitutional
implications of this cause of action in Time, Inc. v. Hill.'6 2 In
that case the Hill family, whose travails had inspired a book
and a subsequent play about a family held hostage and brutalized by criminals, sued when Life magazine published an article
specifically linking the play to the family. It was undisputed
that the play was a fictionalization, and that it departed in
some respects from the events as they actually occurred. The
Hills brought their action under New York's unique privacy
statute.163 Although this statute was originally designed to
remedy what would now be called the appropriation of name
or likeness, it had been expanded by the New York courts to
protect a number of related interests.'6 4 However, as the
Supreme Court noted, "[r]eflecting the fact .

.

. that such appli-

cations may raise serious questions of conflict with the constitutional protections for speech and press, decisions under the
statute have tended to limit the statute's application... 'to
avoid any conflict with the free dissemination of thoughts,
ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest."1 65

161.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment b (1965).
162. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
163. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1909) (amended 1979, 1981,
1983, and 1986).
164. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543
(1966); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d cir. 1940), ce,. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940).
165. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (quoting Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 544-45 (1966)).
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The New York statute did, however, give one "a right of
action when his name, picture, or portrait is the subject of a
'fictitious' report or article."'6 6 This action would later be
recognized as essentially the same as an action for false light
publicity.'67 In this case, James Hill was considered to be a
"newsworthy" person. 6 ' The question, then, was whether the
"fictionalization" could provide a basis for liability on a standard lower than that required for defamation. The Supreme
Court held that it could not. "We hold that the constitutional
protections for speech and press preclude the application of
the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of public
interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published
the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard
of the truth."6 9 Here, again, the application of constitutional
limitations turned on a finding that the publication was of
public concern.
The constitutional doctrine articulated in Time, Inc. v. Hill
was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co.' 7 ° Cantrell involved a false light claim by the
wife and son of a man killed in a bridge collapse against a
newspaper that ran a follow-up article about the family containing numerous distortions and fabrications. The Court reiterated the principles of Time, Inc. v. Hill, citing the passage
quoted above. However, because the district's court's instructions required the jury to make a finding of actual malice, the
Court was not required to address the issue of whether newsworthy reports regarding private individuals could be subjected
to liability on a lesser showing of fault.' 7 '

166. Id. at 384.
167. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249 (1974).
168. Hill, 385 U.S. at 386.
169. Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added).
170. 419 U.S. 245 (1974). It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of
Time, Inc. may not rest on an unshakable foundation. In his concurring opinion
in Cox Broadcasting supra note 128, Justice Powell questioned the continuing
validity of that doctrine in light of the court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974), which rejected a content-based test in the area of
defamation, in favor of one based primarily on the public or private status of the
plaintiff.
171. CantreU, 419 U.S. at 250. The district court's instructions also required
the jury to find that the facts on which liability was based were not newsworthy.
Id. at 250 n.3.
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In the area of false light publicity, as in the area of publicity given to private facts, the courts have explicitly addressed
the question of whether a publication is of public concern.
While the current status of that test is not clear, it has played a
formative role in the application of constitutional limitations to
actions based on false light publicity.
c.

Intrusion upon Seclusion

As set out in the Restatement, the tort of intrusion upon
the seclusion of another is defined as: "One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. " '17 As the
comments to this section indicate, the tort does not depend
upon any publicity being given to the person whose privacy is
invaded. It arises solely from an objectionable invasion into his
or her physical privacy or affairs. 7 '
The Supreme Court has not decided a case which was
based specifically on a claim of intrusion upon seclusion. However, two important federal court cases have shaped the issues
involved in claims that this tort conflicts with the first amendment.
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 174 two reporters for Life magazine obtained permission from the Los Angeles District

The question of whether private-figure plaintiffs can recover under a less
demanding standard has been addressed by at least one lower court. In Wood v.
Hustler Magazine, 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984), ceit denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985),
the court of appeals construed the holding of Gez to permit the states to adopt
a negligence standard in false light claims by private-figure plaintiffs. The court affirmed an award of damages against Hustler Magazine, holding that it had been
negligent in publishing a nude photo of the plaintiff. However, the significance of
this holding is questionable. It is extremely unlikely that, had a standard requiring
the plaintiff to show "actual malice" where the publication was of public concern
been imposed, the outcome would have been any different. The claim was based
on Hustler Magazine's publication of a nude photo of the plaintiff in its "Beaver
Hunt" section. The photograph had been stolen from the plaintiff, and falsely
submitted under her name. It is almost impossible to imagine any court finding
such a publication "newsworthy." Therefore, liability would have been imposed
even under the standard articulated in Time, Inc.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comments a and b (1965).
174. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Attorney's Office to interview and photograph the plaintiff
prior to his arrest for practicing medicine without a license.
They obtained entry to the plaintiffs home under false pretenses, and surreptitiously recorded and photographed him.
After his arrest, Life published an article describing plaintiff as
a quack, and including his name and photograph. On appeal,
the court upheld plaintiff's claim of intrusion. 175 In response
to the magazine's claim that its news gathering activities were
protected by the first amendment, the court held that "[t]he
First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering." 176 Time also claimed that, even if it
could be subjected to liability for invasion of privacy, its publication of the information obtained could not be considered in
calculating damages.177 In response to this claim, the court
held that such a rule would deny the plaintiff recovery for real
injury, with no countervailing benefit to the public interest;
conduct by news media that
furthermore, it "would encourage
78
grossly offends ordinary men."

However, the court in Pearson v. Dodd179 reached a somewhat different conclusion. In that case newspaper columnists
Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson obtained copies of documents improperly taken from the files of Senator Thomas
Dodd. Two former employees of Dodd, with the help of current staffers, copied the documents without Dodd's knowledge
and delivered them to Pearson and Anderson. Pearson and
Anderson wrote articles alleging misconduct by Dodd, based
on this information. Dodd brought actions based on intrusion
upon seclusion and conversion. The district court granted
summary judgment on the intrusion claim, but found Pearson
and Anderson guilty of conversion. They appealed. In affirming summary judgment for the defendants on the invasion of
privacy claim, 8 0 the court of appeals noted that "[i]t has always been considered a defense to a claim of invasion of priva-

175.

Id. at 250.

176. Id. at 249.
177. Id.
178.

Id. at 250.

179.

410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).

180. The district court's ruling finding Pearson and Anderson guilty of conversion was reversed. Id. at 708.
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that the published matter complained of

is of general public interest." 81 The court also emphasized
the importance of separating the invasion from the publication
of the information obtained.'8 2 The court held that Pearson
and Anderson were not liable for the invasion itself, because
they were not participants in the purloining of the files.'
Despite that fact that the evidence was found to have established that appellants were aware the information was improperly obtained, the court went on to hold that liability could not
be premised on the publication of the information, either.
[W]here the claim is that private information concerning
plaintiff has been published, the question of whether that
information is genuinely private or is of public interest
should not turn on the manner in which it has been obtained ....
Here we have separately considered the nature of
appellants' publications concerning appellee, and have
found that the matter published was of obvious public

interest. The publication was not itself an invasion of priva84
cy.1

These two cases, then, take different approaches to the
question of whether the publication of information that is of
public interest is relevant to a claim of intrusion upon seclusion.18 5 Under Dietemann, publication may at least be considered a part of the tort for the purposes of calculating damages.
Under Pearson, however, publishing information with the
knowledge that it was improperly obtained will not result in
liability, so long as the information was of public interest. It
seems reasonable to conclude from the emphasis in Pearson on
separating the invasion from the publication, that even if defendants there had been liable for the invasion itself, the publi-

181. Id. at 703 (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130).
182. Id. at 705 ("[I1n analyzing a claimed breach of privacy, injuries from
intrusion and injuries from publication should be kept clearly separate.").
183. Id.
184. Id. at 705-06.
185. Although the court in Dietemann did not address the question, it seems
reasonable to assume that, had it done so, it would have found the matter to be
one of legitimate public concern. See Hill, Defamation and Ptivacy Under the Fist
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1282 (1976) (citing Dietemann and arguing
that liability for intrusion upon seclusion should not be imposed for exposing
"current criminal activity"; in that case, medical quackery).
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cation of the information obtained would not have been available as a basis for calculating damages.
Another intrusion case supports the assertion that the
consideration of the public interest in the matter disclosed has
8
a role to play in analyzing the tort. In Galella -v. Onassis,"'
the court upheld a restraining order issued against a photographer who was found to be harassing Jacqueline Onassis and
her children. In reaching this holding, however, the court engaged in a brief consideration of the public interest in the information that might be obtained.
Of course legitimate countervailing social needs may warrant some intrusion despite an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy and freedom from harassment.
However the interference allowed may be no greater than
that necessary to protect the overriding public interest ....

Galella's action went far beyond the reasonable

bounds of news gathering. When weighed against the de
minimis public importance of the daily activities of the
defendant, Galella's constant
surveillance.., was unwar87
ranted and unreasonable.'

Based on the opinions in Pearson and Galella, there is
reason to believe that the consideration of public interest in
the information disclosed may be a factor in both the imposition of liability and the calculation of damages.
d.

Appropriation of Name or Likeness

This action is primarily directed to prevention of commercial exploitation of a person's name or image.'88 However, it
also extends to situations in which a person's name, image or
personality is adopted for some non-monetary advantage it
confers.' 8 9 The Restatement describes the action as follows:
"One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy."19 Although it is not infrequently
brought as an additional action in a claim for invasion of priva-

186. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
187. Id. at 995.

188.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
4 (1965).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O TORTS

§ 652C comment b (1965).
§ 652C comment b, illustrations

§

652C (1965).

3 and
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cy based primarily on other theories,'
there is very little
consideration in the cases of the constitutional implications of
2
19

this action.

There is, however, a single Supreme Court case which
discusses the matter directly. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.,' 93 the Court addressed an appropriation
claim by a "human cannonball." Defendant television station
recorded and broadcast the performer's entire 15-second act.
The Supreme Court of Ohio gave judgment for the television
station because it found that a television station "has a privilege to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's
right of publicity."' 9 4 The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court held that the tort of appropriation was distinguishable from other privacy claims, notably false light. The
only way to protect the plaintiff's interest in false light cases is
to minimize publication of the damaging matter, whereas the
only issue in appropriation cases is "who gets to do the publishing." 9 5 Nonetheless, the Court did not hold that there

was no conflict whatever between a claim of appropriation and
the first amendment. Instead, it held:
It is evident, and there is no claim to the contrary, that
petitioner's state-law right of publicity would not serve to
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts
about petitioner's act. Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are pro-

191.

See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123 (1984), cel. de-

nied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
192. For a discussion of such law, especially that arising under the New York
privacy statute, see Hill, supra note 185, at 1276-77. An early case pertinent to
this discussion is Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d
Cir. 1956), cell. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).

193. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
194. Id. at 565 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio
St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (1976)).
195. Id. at 573.

1991]

ROLE OF CONTENT IN DEFAMATION

1039

tected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the
media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. 1"
Therefore it seems apparent that in claims of invasion of
privacy by appropriation of name or likeness, as in other privacy claims, the ability of the press to report information of legitimate concern to the public must be considered. Where the
line will be drawn, as indicated by the Court, is a case-by-case
determination, but the weighing of public interest in the content of the publication or broadcast is required by the first
amendment.
2. The Role of Content in Actions for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress
The recognition of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress as an independent tort is a relatively recent phenomenon. "9' 7 It can be differentiated from the more historically
established tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress,
which is generally tied to the creation of a risk of physical
injury to the plaintiff or a third party.'98 Intentional infliction
claims typically arise in situations where the conduct complained of is either predominantly or entirely speech.199 Although the current Restatement formulation provides for liability to persons other than the one the conduct is intended to
reach, °° the claims discussed herein are first party claims,
and the analysis will be limited to such actions. The Restatement describes that action as follows: "One who by extreme
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for

196. Id. at 574-75 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment d
(Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976)).
197. The emotional distress tort was first incorporated by the Restatement of
Torts in 1948. See LeBel, Emotional Distress, the Fiizt Amendment, and "This Kind of
Speech:" A Heretical Peispective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwel 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
315, 320 (1989). The 1948 Restatement version was widely adopted by the states.
Id.
198. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 197-98, text and n.l.
199. LeBel, supra note 197, at 321.
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965).
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such emotional distress, and if 20
bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm." '
The Supreme Court has recently defined the nature of the
limitations imposed by the first amendment on actions for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell,20 2 the Court considered an action by Jerry Falwell,
nationally known minister and founder of the political action
group, Moral Majority. Falwell had been lampooned by an ad
parody in Hustler, which implied that he was a drunk and had
incestuous relations with his mother. In rejecting Falwell's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court
made two significant holdings, one apparent and the other
somewhat less obvious.
Analogizing from the traditional analysis established by
New York Times and the subsequent Supreme Court defamation
cases, the Court held:
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a
false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e. with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was
2 03

true.

The explicit holding of the Court addressed the concern
that plaintiffs might use the claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to circumvent the constitutional limitations
imposed on defamation actions. If the statement at issue contains a false statement of fact, which would also make it the
basis for a claim of defamation, public figures and public officials must show "actual malice" in order to recover damages.
The Court also held-without explicitly stating-that the
mere expression of an opinion can never form the basis for liability, even should actual malice be shown. Early in the analysis, the Court cited the famous statement from its opinion in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.20 4 that "[t]he First Amendment recog-

201.
202.
203.
204.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Id. at 56.
418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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nizes no such thing as a false idea." °5 The Court accepted
the trial jury's finding that the parody "could not 'reasonably
be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or
actual events in which [he] participated."'20 6 The Court then
held that an award for intentional infliction of emotional distress could not be based on such conduct. 20 7 It reversed the
award with no discussion of whether the actual malice standard had been met, or was even applicable, thereby establishing that a mere expression of opinion could not form the basis
of liability for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, at
20 8
least in a claim by a public figure.
Although explicitly premising constitutional limitations on
the status of the subject of the statement as a public official or
public figure, the Court's opinion suggested that public interest in the content of that statement played a significant role in
the analysis of whether limitations would be applied. The
Court premised its analysis with a restatement of the central
principles served by the first amendment. The Court specifically pointed to the need to protect expression on matters of
public concern: "At the heart of the First Amendment is the
recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of
°
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."29
Furthermore, in rejecting Falwell's claim that the intent to
inflict emotional distress was sufficient to permit liability to be
imposed, the Court stated that "while such a bad motive may
be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other
areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such
2 10
a result in the area of public debate about publicfigures."
Comparison of the result in Falwell with that in another
Supreme Court decision supports the conclusion that the pub-

205. Falwell 485 U.S. at 51.
206. Id. at 57.
207. Id.
208. That this was, in fact, the holding of the Court is confirmed by opinions
in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Ault v. Hustler Magazine, 860 F.2d 877, 880

(9th Cir. 1988), cen. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); Deupree v. Iliff,
860 F.2d 300,
304 (8th Cir. 1988). These cases are discussed in more detail below.
However, the Supreme Court has recently restated this exception, holding
that the first amendment does not create a privilege for opinion, per se, while
confirming that a defamatory statement must "contain a provably false factual

connotation." Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990).
209. Falwell 485 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
210.

Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
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lic or private nature of the information at issue will play a role
in the analysis of emotional distress claims. In Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,21 1 the Supreme Court upheld an award of damages
in a defamation action against a claim that the publication was
protected by the first amendment. Plaintiff was the wife of
Russell Firestone, "scion of one of America's wealthier industrial families." 212 She sued for divorce, and her husband
counter-claimed. The court's judgment, which was a public
record, noted some of the allegations made by the parties and
dissolved the marriage. The basis for the dissolution was incorrectly reported by defendant, Time magazine, and the allegations were reported as facts. Plaintiff brought a libel action
against the magazine.
At trial, plaintiff decided to forgo recovery for injury to
her reputation, and sought damages instead based on what was
essentially emotional distress.2 "s The jury awarded $100,000
2 14
in damages, and the Supreme Court affirmed the award.
While it explicitly rejected the content-based test of Rosenbloom,
the court also examined the nature of the public interest in the
content of the publication in deciding a claim that privilege
should attach to all reports of courtroom proceedings. 15 The
court stated that:
Imposing upon the law of private defamation the rather
drastic limitations worked by New York Times cannot be
justified by generalized references to the public interest in
reports of judicial proceedings. The details of many, if not
most, courtroom battles would add almost nothing toward
advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues thought
to provide principle support for the decision in New York
16
2

Times.

What distinguishes the claim by Reverend Falwell
from the claim by Mrs. Firestone? First, the publication in
Falwell was not characterized as a statement of fact, which the
publication in Firestone clearly was. Second, Mrs. Firestone was

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

424 U.S. 448 (1976).
Id. at 450.
Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 457.
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not found to be a public figure, 217 which the Reverend
Falwell clearly was. 2"8 But the opinions in both cases indicate
that the nature of the issues involved was a significant factor in
the determination of whether the "actual malice" standard
would be imposed.
As noted above, the Supreme Court established in Falwell
that an expression which could not be understood as a statement of fact could not form the basis for liability in a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court did not,
however, establish guidelines for determining what would be
considered a statement of fact and what would not. In addressing claims of emotional distress, lower courts were required to
make this determination, and established tests for doing so.
In Ault v. Hustler Magazine,210 the court of appeals ad-

dressed claims of libel, false light, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court found it well-established that an
expression of opinion could not form the basis of liability in a
libel or false light claim. 22 ° It also noted that the Supreme
Court had extended this rule in Falwell to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.22' The court then applied
the same test to determine whether a publication was a statement of opinion or of fact, for the purpose of deciding whether plaintiff could proceed under any of these actions.
The court set out a three-pronged test for deciding whether the substance of the publication was fact or opinion:
(1) whether the words can be understood in a defamatory
sense ... ; (2) whether the context in which the statements were
made, e.g. public debate or a labor dispute, would lead the audience to anticipatepersuasive speech . . . ; and (3) whether the

language used is the kind generated in a "spirited legal
dispute."222

The court went on to define the concept of "context,"
making it clear that the court was to consider the general pub-

217. Id. at 455.
218. But see infra note 228 and accompanying text; if the statement is one of
opinion, the status of the plaintiff may be irrelevant.
219. 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988).
220. Id. at 880.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 881 (citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983))
(emphasis added).
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lic concern with the issue involved. "We must reject Ault's
effort to limit the meaning of 'public debate' to an oral, contemporaneous exchange of ideas. We think it is clear that
there is a heated and spirited debate on pornography, of
223
which this article is a part."
Another widely adopted analysis of the fact/opinion distinction was outlined in Deupree v. 1lff 224 In affirming a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on a false light claim and
reversing an award of damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the court's opinion dealt almost exclusively
with the question of whether the statement -at issue was one of
fact or opinion. The court set out the following factors for
making that distinction: "(1) the precision and specificity of the
disputed statement; (2) the plausible verifiability of the statement; (3) the literary context in which the statement was made;
'225
and (4) the public context in which the statement was made.
Again, in analyzing the question of whether the public context
was one which would indicate that the statement was one of
opinion, the court considered the content as well as the forum.
The statement was made during the sort of call-in radio
show that is generally designed to encourage listener participation and to foster the airing of divergent viewpoints .... [T]he show served as a broad-based forum for
opinions on the appropriateness of sex education in
schools generally as well as a forum for the specific discussion of a controversial sex education course in a local public school. 2 6
In holding that such a statement could not serve as the
basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the court cited Falwell, and noted that there "the Court held
that 'in the area of public debate' . . . first amendment principles must operate to limit 'a State's authority to protect its
citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional dis-

223. Id.
224. 860 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1988).
225. Id. at 303 (citing Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (8th Cir.
1986) (en banc), cen. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986), and Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cen. denied 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)) (emphasis
added).

226. Deupree, 860 F.2d at 303-04.
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tress. ' 227 The court also held that the fact that plaintiff was a
private figure did not remove the statement from first amendment protection.228
Taken together, these cases show that the determination
of whether a statement is one of fact or opinion will often be
the dispositive question in claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on speech. Furthermore, they indicate
that consideration of statement content cannot be separated
from the determination of whether a statement is one of fact
or opinion, and that a statement will be more likely to be considered one of opinion when made in the context of a debate
on an issue of significant public interest.
It seems obvious that the determination of whether a
statement is one of fact or opinion cannot be made without
considering the content of the statement; it would be impossible to do so otherwise. But it is also reasonable to conclude
that statements regarding matters of public concern will also
be more likely to be opinions. First, issues of public concern
are those in which members of the public are likely to be most
motivated to speak, and a high degree of motivation to speak
is likely to produce energetic or hyperbolic statements of opinion, rather than objective assertions of fact. Second, issues of
public concern are generally issues precisely because they are
unresolved or incapable of simple factual resolution; speech regarding such issues is less likely to consist of factual assertions
itself, and to the extent that it does, those assertions are more
likely to be received with skepticism. Finally, it is in the area of
debate on issues of legitimate public interest that it is most
important to protect erroneous statements of fact, in order to
ensure that the discussion necessary to the resolution of such
issues is not excessively chilled.
In emotional distress claims, then, the consideration of
whether the content of the statement at issue implicates issues
of public concern is a vital element in the application of first
amendment limitations. The need to foster debate on such
issues is explicitly relied upon to support the application of
first amendment principles to this area of the law, and is a

227.

Id. at 304 (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S 46, 50 (1988)).

228. Deupree, 860 F.2d at 304-05 (citing Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)); see supra note 225.
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functional element in the analysis of when those limitations
will be applied.
3.

Links to the Law of Defamation

As has already been mentioned, and as several of the cases
discussed above illustrate, claims of defamation, invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are now
commonly brought in the same action, based on the same
conduct.22 9 In an action for defamation, the plaintiff may
abandon any attempt to show injury to reputation, and rely on
proof of emotional distress as the basis for an award of damages. 2' 0 The relationship between defamation and the invasion
of privacy was recognized in the formative articulation of the
privaright of privacy, 23 ' as was the relationship of the right 23of
2
distress.
emotional
on
based
cy to claims for damages
The close relationship between these areas of the law is
also emphasized by the reliance of the courts on the constitutional limitations forged in the defamation cases in applying
similar constraints to privacy and emotional distress claims. A
similar analysis and a similar standard of fault-the "actual
malice" standard-have now been applied to all three areas.
The consistent consideration of statement content in these
non-defamation actions argues persuasively for the viability of
a content-based test in the area of defamation.
D. The Nature of the Competing Interests: Reputation versus Freedom of Expression
The role of content in the formation and application of
the constitutional law of defamation and several related causes
of action has been significant. Perhaps more important to the
analysis of constitutional limitations on defamation actions,
however, is understanding the function that content serves in
balancing the conflicting public interests involved. Only the
determination that a defamatory statement contains content of
public importance can provide an adequate basis for resolving
the conflict between the societal interest in the protection of

229.
230.
231.
232.

Smolia, supra note 126, at 430.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460-61 (1976).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 197-98.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 197-98 n.1.
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individual reputation, and the vital importance of free speech
to a democratic society.
Traditionally, the states provided for the protection of
individual reputation by holding those found guilty of publishing defamatory statements strictly liable for their offenses, and
by presuming monetarily compensable damage to the
plaintiffs reputation, rather than requiring proof of such damage.2"' Ultimately, the Supreme Court perceived a danger in
allowing the states to use defamation law to silence criticism of
government officials or public figures who might influence
events of public importance.3 4 Now, however, the Court is
confronted with the dilemma of protecting the public interest
in political and social self-determination, through the dissemination of comment and information, without protecting false
statements of fact that bear no relation to that interest. The
Court must steer between the Scylla of unredressed libel and
the Charybdis of censorship and intimidation of the media and
public.
In order to suggest a possible course, we must have a clear
understanding of the nature of these competing interests. Constitutional defamation law is usually understood as addressing
a conflict between the individual's interest in protecting his or
her reputation (or the states' solicitation for that interest), and
the public interest in protecting free speech as a means to
more effective self-determination, in either the governmental
or societal realms. 235 This interpretation tends to support a
status-based determination of the applicability of limits on
defamation recovery, by presenting the interest in protecting
reputation as safeguarding an essentially individual right. If the
right to protection from unfounded attacks on one's reputation is essentially individual, then the assertion that such a
right can be voluntarily abandoned by individual actions is a

233. See supra note 94.
234. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
235. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967);. N.Y Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270, 279 (1964). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 48
(1971), stating that "[t]raditional arguments suggest that libel law protects two
separate interests of the individuak first, his desire to preserve a certain privacy

around his personality from

unwarranted intrusion, and, second, a desire to

preserve his public good name and reputation." (Emphasis added.)
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reasonable one. This is not, however, the only possible construction of the interest in the protection of reputation. Nor is
it a necessary assumption of current constitutional doctrine.
Alternatively, the interest in freedom of speech protected
by the Constitution may be conceived of as one grounded in
an individual need for self-expression, regardless of social context or impact, opposing society's concern for preventing the
impairment of social order and cohesion that results from
unredressed injury to individual reputations. Again, it is questionable whether such a theory of free speech is adequate to
explain the application of first amendment protections. Still, if
the interest in either reputation or in freedom of expression is
more intimately related to the benefit of society as a whole,
then constitutional doctrine should be weighted to favor that
interest. For this reason, it is essential to examine the nature
of our interests in reputation and free speech in more detail.

1. The Interest in the Protection of Reputation
Professor Post has discussed the main theories of the nature of reputation that have had an impact on legal reasoning
in the area of defamation." 6 Post identifies three basic concepts of reputation as being the most influential. The first of
these is the concept of reputation as property:
It is this concept of reputation that underlies our image of
the merchant who works hard to become known as
creditworthy or of the carpenter who strives to achieve a
name for quality workmanship. Such a reputation is capable of being earned, in the sense that it can be acquired as
a result of an individual's efforts and labor ....
The concept of reputation as property presupposes
that individuals are connected with each other through the
institution of the market .... The purpose of the law of
defamation is to protect individuals within the market by
ensuring that their reputation is not wrongfully deprived
of its proper market value.23 7
However, despite its apparent social importance, and its influence on the law of defamation,2 1 8 the concept of reputation

236.
tion, 74
237.
238.

Post, The Social Foundation of Defamation Lazo: Reputation and the ConstituCALIF. L. REV. 601 (1986).
Id. at 693-95.
See, e.g., Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 64 (Harlan, J., dissenting) and Gemlz, 418
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as property alone is not sufficient to explain all aspects of that
law. Post finds evidence of this in the fact that "[t]he common
law of defamation will not offer redress for untrue communications that are not defamatory, even if they cause damage to an
individual's credit or business opportunities. An example is a
23 9
communication to the effect that an individual is dead."
The concept of reputation as property also cannot explain the
common law presumption of damages which "puts defamation
law in the business of compensating individuals for harms
which, from the perspective of reputation as property, may
2 40
well be nonexistent."
Post next examines the concept of reputation as honor,
which, he says "may be defined as a form of reputation in
which an individual personally identifies with the normative
characteristics of a particular social role and in return personally receives from others the regard and estimation that society
accords to that role."2 4' He sees the function of this form of
reputation to be the reinforcing of social roles, and notes that
"[t]he function was epitomized in the law of seditious libel. '2 42 However, as Post notes, the doctrine of seditious libel
was explicitly repudiated by the Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan. 3 In addition, the reinforcement of social roles does not have a profound influence in the United
States, where the individual's right and ability to determine his
or her own social status is greatly prized.2 44 The concept of
reputation as honor, then, is no longer central to constitutional defamation law.
Finally, Professor Post describes the concept of reputation
as dignity. He first cites Justice Stewart's frequently quoted
2 45 to
concurrence in Rosenblatt v. Baer,
the effect that "[t]he

U.S. at 350; both opinions discuss defamation damages as specifically ascertainable-a view which reflects the concept of reputation as having a market, hence a

quantifiable, measure of value.
239. Post, supra note 236, at 697 (citing Cohen v. New York Times Co., 153
A.D. 242, 138 N.Y.S. 206 (1912)).
240. Post, supra note 236, at 697.
241. Post, supra note 236, at 699.
242. Post, supra note 236, at 702.
243. Post, supra note 236, at 723 (citing N.Y Times, 376 U.S. 254, 273-78
(1964)).
244. Post, supra note 236, at 706-07.
245. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty."24 6 Individual dignity, as this passage indicates, is at the core of the interest that defamation law seeks to
protect. From what source do we derive this dignity, and how
can the statements of another deprive us of it? As Post observes, individuals derive their dignity, their sense of place and
worth, from their relationship to society, which provides it by
enforcing certain rules of conduct between its individual members. In this way, he explains:
[O]ur own sense of intrinsic self-worth ... is perpetually
dependant upon the ceremonial observance by those
around us of rules of deference and demeanor. The law of
defamation can be conceived as a method by which society
polices breaches of its rules of deference and demeanor,
thereby protecting the dignity of its members ....
The dignity that defamation law protects is thus the
respect (and self-respect) that arises from full membership
in society .... Implicit in the concept of reputation as
dignity, therefore, is the potential for a dual function of
defamation law: the protection of an individual's interest
in dignity... and the enforcement for society's interest in
its rules of civility, which is to say its interest in defining
and maintaining the contours of its own social constitution. 217
Post argues that both the concepts of reputation as property and of reputation as dignity are present in the common
law of defamation.2 4 In the area of defamation law, however, the goals of the common law come into conflict with the
constitutional doctrine of free speech. The clash, as Post
frames it, is not "an abstract conflict between the first amendment and something called 'reputation,"'24 9 but rather "the
complex and profoundly significant issue of striking a balance
between the protection of [the] constitutional autonomy [of

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 92.
Post, supra note 236, at 710-11.
Post, supra note 236, at 717.
Post, supa note 236, at 740.
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the individual] and the maintenance of community cohesion
and identity."250

Post frames this conflict in terms precisely opposite to
those traditionally employed. 5 ' Rather than addressing a
conflict between a societal interest in free speech and an individual interest in reputation, he describes constitutional defamation law as a conflict between the societal interest in enforcing the rules of deference and demeanor that are the basis of
reputation, and the individual's interest in self-expression. Post
is persuasive in describing the nature of society's interest in
protecting reputation. Society maintains its cohesion and identity in part by redressing injuries to individual reputations. If
this proposition is accepted, then the value addressed by the
tort of defamation is not merely the protection of individual
reputation, but the maintenance of the cohesion and identity
of the community as a whole. While this may to some degree
be true of all tort actions, in that they create a general deterrent to wrongdoing by requiring compensation of victims, Post
has demonstrated the unique role that defamation law plays in
preserving adherence to precepts of social interaction necessary to individual dignity and communal order. The interest in
protecting this value is not determinatively affected by the
voluntariness of a plaintiffs participation in a public controversy, because the public interest would be impaired by permitting an individual plaintiff, by his or her actions, to waive the
protection of an interest invested in society as a whole.
However, society's interest in free speech is not simply a
matter of protecting an individual need for freedom of expression. As shall be seen, the need for freedom of expression is as
vital to society as a whole as is the protection of reputation.252
2.

The Interest in Freedom of Expression

Professor Schauer has analyzed free speech theories in
light of the trend in constitutional law to reduce the influence
of juries on the outcome of public defamation cases.253

250.
251.
252.
253.

Post, supra note 236, at 741.
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 253-63 and accompanying text.
Schauer, The Role of the People in Fist Amendment Theoy, 74 CALIF. L.
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Schauer draws a contrast between utilitarian theory, which
"employs as its standard of evaluation some calculus designed
254
to determine what is best for the population as a whole,"
and deontological theory, which "focuses on the inherent rightness or wrongness of particular actions, regardless of the consequences those actions produce."2 55 With regard to
deontological theory, he notes:
[T]hese theories are couched in terms of self-expression,
self-realization, or self-fulfillment, but the core idea is the
same-speaking is part of what it is to be a person, and
restrictions on that expression of personhood by the state
the public interest would be
are simply wrong, even if 256
served by those restrictions.
As Professor Schauer goes on to discuss, however, there
are several flaws in the 'self-expression' theory of free speech
as an explanation for the nature of constitutional defamation
law. First, Schauer observes:
Self-expression theories founder because they do not distinguish speaking from a wide range of other
self-expressive activities that fall outside the purview of the
first amendment. A satisfactory theory of free speech must
explain not only why speech is distinguishable from other
distinctly human activities, such as riding a motorcycle or
appearing naked in public, but also why speech needs
257
more protection.
So the special role of speech in protecting a democratic
society's interest in self-determination is not addressed by a
theory which protects self-expression on its own merits. Second, Schauer notes that "self-expression theories do not provide a reason for protecting those self-expressive activities that
can cause harm to others ... a plausible natural-rights theory
of free speech based on liberty of self-expression must contain
25
an exception allowing restriction when harm is caused."
Thus, the self-expression theory fails to accommodate one of
the central concerns of constitutional defamation law: redress-

REv. 761 (1986).
254. Id. at 769.
255.

Id.

256. Id. at 772.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 772-73.
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ing injury to reputation that may be caused by unrestricted
speech. Finally, he states:
Self-expression theories evaluate freeness of speech in
terms of the human needs of some human being. Under
such a theory it would no longer be clear that speech by
corporations implicates the protections of free speech...
[n]or would it remain clear that speech with respect, to
matters of politics, or public concern ... has some special
place in the first amendment pantheon.259
Although speech involving matters of public concern is not
limited to purely political issues,26 ° it is clear that matters of
public concern are given special importance in the constitutional law of defamation.26 1 Furthermore, since many cases
implicating constitutional limits on defamation law now involve
media defendants who are corporations, the failure of the
self-expression theory to address their speech interests would
seem to be a fatal anomaly.262 The interest in freedom of
speech that constitutional defamation law seeks to protect,
then, is not adequately defined by a theory based on the protection of an individual right of free expression.

3.

A Conflict in the Public Interest

If constitutional protection of free speech is not supported
solely by an individual right of self-expression, how is it to be
justified? The answer is articulated in the first decision of the
Supreme Court applying first amendment principles to the
common law of defamation:

259. Id. at 773 (footnotes omitted).
260. Note, for example, the protection extended to purely commercial speech
in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and

Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
261. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1986). See
also the preceding discussion of the role of content in the Supreme
notes 54-109 and accompanying text, and lower court decisions, supra
and accompanying text.
262. For example, the defendants in most of the major cases in
ment of constitutional defamation law have been corporations.

Court, supra
notes 111-23
the developSee Dun &

Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
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The general proposition that freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment has
long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, "was fashioned to assure unfettered
of political and
interchange of ideas for the bringing about
263
people."
the
by
desired
changes
social
Although self-expression in its own right is not sufficient to
support or to explain constitutional limitations of defamation
recovery, its role in protecting the political and social selfdetermination of the members of a democratic society is central. The ability to disseminate information and opinion regarding persons and events that may significantly affect the
lives of its constituents is the cornerstone of a democratic society. Without that ability, even the right to elect representatives
and executives is impaired, because uninformed participation
in the electoral process does not effectively manifest the will of
the electorate.
The public interest in protecting free speech, then, is not
less significant than the interest in maintaining community cohesion and identity. Both are fundamental needs of a society
which seeks to protect and maximize the dignity of its individual members. The conflict implicit in constitutional defamation
doctrine is not between individual interests in reputation or in
self-expression on one hand, and the interests of society as a
whole on the other. It is, rather, a conflict between equally
vital and important public interests, a conflict in the public
interest itself.
E. The Inadequacy of the Current Doctrine to Protect the Interests
at Stake
As noted at the outset of this comment, there is considerable discontent with the current state of libel litigation.26 4
For plaintiffs, public figures in particular, the requirements imposed by the New York Times actual malice standard have rendered judicial relief extremely difficult to obtain. 65 However,

263. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)).
264. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
265. The difficulties confronted by plaintiffs in modern libel actions are concisely summarized by the staff of the Iowa Libel Research Project:
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it is not at all clear that the current constitutional law of defamation adequately serves any of its stated goals. As Dean
Bezanson has noted:
For those whose interest is in protecting reputation,
today's libel tort fails in almost all respects to do so. It
underprotects the community-based interest in reputation,
and overprotects the reputationally-unrelated interests in
truth, responsible journalism, and freedom from emotional harm. For those whose interest is protecting the press
from unnecessary inhibition and government control of
the standards of journalism, today's libel tort is anathema,
for the chief consequence of libel today is inhibition of the
press from violating judicially-crafted standards of journalism. Finally, for those who placed faith in the privileges
created by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny,
today's libel tort must be discouraging, if not utterly devastating, for it falls substantially short of safeguarding press
freedom and fails to safeguard individual reputation as
well.26
Professor Franklin has also described the state to which
current constitutional defamation doctrine has brought the
administration of the law:
By using what it intended to be a content-free surrogate-the plaintiff's status-the Court has the worst of both
worlds. Some courts apparently decide the plaintiff's status

In 90 percent of reported cases that reach the courts, plaintiffs lose,

largely on the basis of constitutional privilege issues. When the privileges are determined to be applicable, their application often renders
falsity and reputational harm practically irrelevant. Thus, plaintiffs who
have been falsely defamed may not be able to clear their names because they cannot prove that the defendant acted negligently or with
actual malice. Even in cases in which the truth or falsity of the statements is adjudicated, the slowness of the litigation process means that
the decision comes long after the time when it can help to restore
the plaintiff's reputation.
Wissler, Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, Why Curent Libel Law Doesn't Work supra
note 4, at 30.
266. Bezanson, The Libel Toit Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 556 (1988).
The proposition that current constitutional defamation doctrine is inadequate to
protect the interest in freedom of speech is restated in the conclusion of the
Iowa Libel Research Project that "even though the press prevails in the vast majority of cases, enormous costs are incurred litigating state of mind and related
privilege issues. Tihe chilling effect of libel suits is due more to litigation costs and
intrusion into the editorial process that to adverse judgments." Wissler, Why Current Libel Law Doesn't Work, supra note 4, at 31.
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surreptitiously by looking first at content. Those that try to
use the announced rules grant more protection to gossip
columns than to investigative reports ....Once the Court
decided in Gertz that false speech needed protection from
strict liability for libel damages, it rejected any further role
for the first amendment and turned the rest of the task
over to tort law. This had the effect of ignoring why the
Court rejected strict liability in the first place-concern for
2 67
the impact on public discussion.
Still, despite the difficulties that constitutional intrusion into
the common law may have caused, there is a general agreement that some accommodation of first amendment interests
is required in this area of the law.2 68 The question remaining
is what form that accommodation should take, especially in
light of the problematic outcome of decisions in the lower
courts applying the current status-based test.
F.

Summary of the Analysis

Both the interest in protecting free speech and the interest in maintaining community cohesion and identity through
protection of reputation are vital needs of a society which
seeks to maximize the dignity and social participation of its
individual members. The current, primarily status-based analysis of the application of constitutional limitations on defamation actions fails to adequately protect either society's interest
in the protection of reputation or its interest in ensuring free
expression regarding issues of genuine public concern. In addition, the premises upon which the primarily status-based test
adopted by the Court is based are not adequate to support
either the predominance of considerations of status, or the
relegating of content analysis to its current minor role. These
premises have led the courts to impose a higher burden of
proof even where no issue of first amendment importance is
involved. Nor does the utilization of a content-based test necessarily involve a greater risk of chilling free speech. On the
contrary, the consideration of statement content in several

267.

Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law, supia note 5, at 1682 (footnotes omit-

ted).
268. The author's research has not disclosed any commentator who suggests
that constitutional limitations on defamation actions should be entirely eliminated,
and the doctrine returned to the common law.

ROLE OF CONTENT IN DEFAMATION

1991]

1057

non-defamation causes of action indicates its utility in properly
balancing interests which conflict with the principle of free
speech.
An analysis which premises the application of first amendment limitations to defamation recovery primarily on the status of an individual plaintiff fails to address the central issue in
the conflict between reputation and freedom of expression.
The public's fundamental interest is not in the relative familiarity of a plaintiff's name, nor in the title of his or her office, but
rather in the plaintiffs ability to affect the outcome of events
that will have a substantial impact on the public as a whole, or
on some significant portion of it. As the Supreme Court stated
in Rosenbloom:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private
individual is involved ....

The public's primary interest is

in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriconduct,
69
2

ety.

The only sufficient justification for imposing on a plaintiff the
nearly insurmountable burden of demonstrating "actual malice," then, is the need to avoid placing on the public the truly
impossible task of effectively guiding the development of its
own civic life without the ability to learn of and comment on
the people and events that shape that life. At least to the degree that it recognizes the vital role that content analysis must
play in reconciling the competing interests in this area, the
holding of Dun & Bradstreet represents a significant improvement over prior cases. There is still, however, much room for
improvement.
IV.

PROPOSAL

In the wake of Dun & Bradstreet, several commentators
have argued for a rejection of the consideration of statement
content and a return to the more purely status-based determination of Gertz.27 These authors argue that the movement

269. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
270. See, e.g., Comment, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss: Cutting Away the Protective Mantle of Genz, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1171 (1986) [hereinafter Comment: Cutting
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toward basing the application of first amendment limitations
on a content determination-evidenced by the Dun & Bradstreet
opinion-may "deter exercise of the freedom of expression"271 or result in "the uncertain administration of justice."2 7 There is, however, no sound foundation for the assertion that a content-based test would necessarily be less protective of freedom of expression.273 There is also substantial
evidence to support the assertion that the current doctrine is
insufficiently solicitous of society's interest in protecting reputation. 274 As to the assertion that a content-based test will result in an unpredictable application of constitutional
protections, this is the result of the Supreme Court's imprecise
definition of how to determine what content will be protected,
not an inherent defect in a content-based analysis itself. One of
the most detailed and influential tests of public figure status-that formulated by the Waldbaum court-already consists
largely of content considerations.1 75 There is no reason, then,
to presume that content determination will be more difficult
than status determination.
Professor Franklin has recently considered the role of
content in constitutional defamation law, 276 and has proposed a two-tiered approach to the application of first amendment limitations to recovery. On the first and most protected
tier, defamatory speech which clearly involved issues of self- governance would invoke the full force of the N.Y Times "actual
malice" doctrine.2 77 On the second tier, content and status
would both be considered in determining whether the N.Y

Away the Protective Mantle]; Comment, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders: "Mat-

teis of Private Concern" Give Libel Defendants Lowered First Amendment Prvtection, 35
CATH. U.L. REV. 883 (1986) [hereinafter Lowered Fist Amendment Protection]; Comment, The "Public Interest or Concern" Test-Have We Resurrected a Standard that

Should Have Remained in the Defamation Graveyard, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 647 (1987);
Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old Doctrine in the Constitu-

tional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 241 (1987).
271. See Comment, Lowered Fitst Amendment Protection, supra note 270, at 920.
272. See Comment, Cutting Away the Protective Mantle, supra note 270, at 1194.
273. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 85 and 265.
275. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
276. Franklin, Consitutional Libel Law, supra note 5.
277. According to Franklin's test "[t]he first cut, then, may be that speech
related to self-governance involved charges of abuse of power, of criminality, or of
carelessness or oversight that affect public health or safety." Franklin, Constitutional
Libel Law, supra note 5, at 1678.
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Times standard or a less demanding standard would be ap2 78
plied.
The need for a more functional and well-founded test for
the application of constitutional limits is clear. Franklin's proposal is a considerable improvement on the current status of
the law. However, given the inherent complexity and difficulty
involved in weighing the competing interests in this area, a
simpler, single-criterion test is preferable and would adhere
more closely to the goals of the first amendment outlined
above.
Under this test, and following closely the requirements
outlined by the Waldbaum court, the application of first
amendment limitations on the law of defamation would be
premised on public interest content, without regard to the
status of the plaintiff. The analysis would proceed as follows:
I. Is a public controversy involved?
A. Is there a "real dispute," i.e. an issue where there
is substantial and reasonable variance of opinion
among those addressing it, such that assertions as to
the conduct of persons involved will not automatically
be dismissed as spurious and false?
B. Will the outcome of the dispute affect the general
public, or a significant segment of it, in an appreciable way; i.e. will its ramifications be felt by a significant number of persons who are not direct participants?
II. Is the statement pertinent to the plaintiff's participation in that controversy?
III. Does the plaintiffs involvement in the events giving
rise to the controversy predate the making of the defamatory statement?
Only if all the prongs of this test were met would the 'actual
malice' standard be applied, and the plaintiff be required to
prove the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Short of this, the remedies available to the
plaintiff would be determined by the tenets of the state's common law.
The application of such a test should be sufficient to allow
the courts to discriminate between those issues that truly in-

278. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law, supra note 5, at 1679.
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voke values protected by the first amendment, and those
that-whatever their appeal to transitory fancy-are not of a
kind meriting the nearly impenetrable insulation of the 'actual
malice' standard.
The public controversy criterion would serve two important goals not addressed by the current doctrine. First, by requiring a real dispute, it would ensure that the protection of
that standard was not extended to fanciful or irrelevant assertions. Second, by requiring that the outcome have an impact
on a significant number of persons not participating in the
dispute, this test would withdraw the protection from issues at
most tangentially related to the values that the first
amendment was designed to protect. Some difficulty would
doubtless be encountered in determining whether the number
of persons affected by an issue is significant. This difficulty
could be mitigated by assessing whether the scope of the publication was such that it would be likely to reach the interested
audience, but not to vastly exceed that audience.
By requiring that the statement be pertinent to the public
controversy involved, the second criterion of the test would
ensure that participation in such issues did not open the floodgates for defamatory allegations regarding any aspect of a
plaintiff's life.
Although the first two branches of the test may seem sufficient to determine whether the issue is one of public concern,
they are not alone sufficient to' protect potential plaintiffs.
Absent a requirement that the plaintiffs participation in the
events giving rise to the controversy predate statements about
him or her, a false allegation of the plaintiff's involvement in a
crime or other matter of public interest would be protected.
By demanding that the plaintiff's participation in the controversy predate the allegedly defamatory statement, the test
would also prevent the defendant from manufacturing a controversy in order to attack the plaintiffs reputation.
Such a test would serve to comprehensively reform the
constitutional law of defamation.27 9 More importantly, how-

279. The burden of proof.establishing that a matter is or is not one of public
concern has not been discussed, and is beyond the scope of this comment. However, under existing doctrine, if the matter was arguably of public interest, tile
burden would probably be placed on the plaintiff. Philadelphia Newpapeis v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986).
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ever, regardless of the particular test devised for its application, a content-based analysis will encourage the courts to consider the issues that lie at the heart of the conflict between
constitutional protections of free expression and the societal
interest in protecting individual reputation.
V.

CONCLUSION

I do not mean to suggest, as have other commentators, 28 0

that

speech

involving

matters

of

political

self-governance is the only kind protected by the first
amendment. Artistic, philosophic, scientific, and even commercial expression can and do have as profound an impact on
society as speech more closely linked to matters of
self-governance, and hence are also worthy of protection. However, when expression-in any of these forums-crosses the line
into defamation, and factual assertions are made which damage the reputation of individuals or entities, we have left the
arena of opinion or reasoned debate. Society's ability to protect the dignity of its members and its own cohesion is implicated, and only profound societal interests can justify the protection of such false speech. The only interest sufficient to this
role is our fundamental dedication to political and social
self-determination, to public participation in the events that
will shape our society. By embracing a primarily status-based
analysis of the application of first amendment protections in
the area of defamation, the Supreme Court, even while attempting to ensure greater protection of individual reputation,
abandoned the only criterion by which it could ensure that
interest would not be excessively invaded.
The considerable body of critical commentary on the current doctrine of constitutional defamation law indicates the
pressing need for reform and clarification in this area of the
law. The test outlined above, when combined with a summary
judgment alternative for plaintiffs who seek simply an adjudication of falsity rather than a determination of fault, presents a
comprehensive alternative to the present system of libel tort
litigation. Still, the particular test adopted by the Court is less

280. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Pinciples and Some Fist Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquity Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978).
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important than the recognition that the status-based analysis in
current constitutional defamation doctrine has led this area of
law far astray. The application of first amendment principles to
the area of defamation will always be a complex task, and one
which requires a case-by-case calculation of the weight of the
competing aspects of the public interest: protection of dignity
and community cohesion on the one hand, and providing for
the fundamental interest in societal self-determination on the
other. The introduction of a content-based test to constitutional defamation doctrine will not eliminate the need to balance
these conflicting interests, but such a test offers the best opportunity for ensuring that the issues addressed are those that
are central to this conflict, and thus that it is truly the public
interest that is served.
James Chadwick

